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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
The "automobile problem" has become the most 
serious threat to the continued survival of the American 
Agency System since the first American stock insurance 
company was organized many years ago . 
The success of "direct writers" in this field is 
no longer a matter of conjecture but a practical reality . 
Since they have had fantastic success in an insurance line 
which has been generally unprofitable , it does not appear 
unreasonable to predict that they will have even greater 
success in the generally profitable lines . 
Why the American Agency System has failed is of 
little importance . The important thing now is that the 
industry is in a situation where many agents are considering 
getting out of the insurance business . 
The lack of an efficient system of selling, under-
writing, policy- writing , and premium collection is exactly 
the weakness of the American Agency System that the direct 
writers have been able to use to their advantage. 
There are only two items which make up the premium 
dollar . The direct writers attacked the first, or loss ex-
pense item, by careful selection of risks. It is generally 
recognized that less than 20% of all auto risks cause most 
of the losses . By concentrating on the other SO% the direct 
writers have reduced their loss ratio far below the industry 
average . 
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The second, or production cost item, they attacked 
by adoption of modern efficient methods of underwriting, 
policy writing, and premium collection. MUch of their success 
in this has been due to the use of highly automatic machines. 
Through the use of these two approaches, they have 
been able to offer substantial reductions to the good 
drivers. These reductions have enabled them to attract an 
unusually large proportion of the good risks. 
Today, many experiments are also aimed in two 
directions--equitable premium distribution between good and 
bad insureds and reduction of expenses. 
In the effort to reach a more equitable premium 
distribution between good and bad insureds, "merit rating" 
is now being revived. Its proponents seem to think that it's 
a "cure-all" that will solve all the automobile problems. 
The plans themselves vary all the way from one uniform compul-
sory plan in a southern state to as many as twenty-six in-
dividual company plans in a midwestern state. They all have 
one thing in common- they seek to reward the 'good driver" 
and penalize the "bad driver" . 
The "m~rit rating" idea in the automobile field is 
not new . Many individual company plans have been tried over 
the years. Generally they have met with indifferent success. 
Two reasons they did not prove successful were the general 
inadequacy of the "lJlanuel" rate level, and inability to 
accurately check on the record of the driver. This last 
factor led many companies to the use of plans based on their 
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own experience with the insured. Since a risk could not get 
a credit until at least a year after they were insured by the 
company, these plans lost much of the sales advantage so 
essential to the attracting of good risks. 
"Bureau merit rating" plans have been tried on at 
least two previous occasions. That they weren't successful 
is evidenced by the fact that they were quickly abandoned. 
Why they were unsuccessful is less certain. In addition to 
inadequate rates and lack of an adequate means to check the 
record of the driver, it is known that the increased expenses 
of agents and companies alike in administering the plans 
contributed greatly to their failure. 
Starting with the assumption that the rate level 
is adequate, the newer "bureau merit- rating" plans attempt 
to overcome the difficulty of collecting the proper premium 
in two ways. First of all, it is generally felt that in 
many states complete records of accidents are now available 
for the checking of drivers' records. "Bureau merit rating" 
cannot work effectively until the machinery for collecting 
such information is put into motion. In many states, legis-
lative action is necessary to impose the duty on law enforce-
ment and court officials to report such information to a 
central office . 
A problem of even greater significance is the fact 
that these statewide plans recently introduced retain the 
disadvantage of the older plans-administering of them increases 
the expense of the agents and companies . For some unexplained 
5 
reason expense allowances are frequently cut in these plans, 
in the face of strong evidence that actual expenses increase. 
In one state between a general rate reduction made 
in anticipation of the adoption of merit rating, a further 
20% reduction in the rate on risks with no chargeable points, 
and a reduction in commission per-centage of 20% the agents 
have suddenly found themselves in the position of having 
substantially more work to do with their overall commission 
dollars on the risks with clear records reduced over 40%. 
It is small consolation to them that they will receive more 
commission on those with bad records, since they usually have 
to put these in the assigned plan where the commission is 
drastically reduced. 
± believe it is significant that the "bureau" 
plans of''merit rating" do not contemplate that policy writing 
and premium collecting will be done by the companies. Instead 
these plans tend to ignore the problem of "expense reduction" 
entirely. Cutting an agent's commission does reduce company 
expense, but it also reduces the agents income. With every 
commission cut some agents decide to "sell out". Assuming 
they "sell out" to some other independent agent, some 
business is lost that the agent held personally. Much of 
this ends up going to the direct writers, further complicat-
ing the problem. 
When a reduction in company expenses is achieved 
by cutting the agent's commission without reducing his work, 
it is merely a commission cut. Only when the commission cut 
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is accompanied by transferring some of the work to the company 
(where it can be handled more efficiently) does an actual 
expense reduction take place . 
It is my intention to present in greater detail the 
development and history of automobile "Merit Rating" plans 
and how they have and will effect the American Agency System 
and the insuring public . It is also my intention to attempt 
to prove that "Merit Rating" plans are inimical to the very 
fundamental principles of the theory of insurance" •••••••••• 
because they endeavor to divide the " losses of the few among 
the few loss producers". 
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CHAPTER II 
THE AUTOMOBILE RATE SITUATION 
In September of 1961 , Senator Estes Kefauver, 
chairman of the anti- trust and monopoly subcommittee of the 
u.s . Senate Committee on the Judiciary, released the second 
insurance report of the subcommittee . It set forth the 
following principles for placing greater reliance upon 
competition in ratemaking : 
l . Elimination of laws making membership in 
rating bureaus compulsory . 
2 . Elimination of laws by which rates are 
established by the States on a uniform 
non- competitive basis . 
3 . Rates should become effective immediately 
upon filing , with the subsequent right of 
state insurance commissioners to review 
and disapprove rates which do not meet 
the statutory standard . 
4. Neither individual competitors nor com-
binations of competitors (through rating 
bureaus) should have the legal right to 
oppose the rate filings of other insurers . 
5. The public should be able to purchase 
insurance at the lowest available rates 
consistent with solvency. Therefore, 
independence of action would be encouraged 
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by eliminating unnecessary restrictions 
upon the right to deviate . 
6 . Advisory organizations would be subject 
to careful supervision by the states . * 
These principles were incorporated into a bill 
introduced by Seantor Kefauver in Congress for the regulation 
of fire and casualty rates in the District of Columbia . 
Any changes in the rate regulatory pattern in the 
direction of having competition serve as the regulator of 
rates will have profound effect on the automobile rate 
situation. First , what about adequacy of rates? During 
1960, the MUtual Insurance Rating Bureau introduced revisions 
of r ates for private passenger cars in seventeen states, 
having a countrywide effect of 1 . 9% increase in bodily 
injury premiums and a decrease of O. J% in property damage 
premiums , or an overall increase in total bodily injury and 
property damage premiums of 0 . 6%. Commercial car rates were 
revised in twenty- one states , with a total bodily injury and 
~operty damage premium increase of 1 . 7% , and garage rates 
were increased 5. 5% on the average . It is to be noted that 
in 1961 , private passenger car rates were increased in twenty--
five states, varying from 1 . 6% in Mississippi to 12 . 4% in New 
Mexico . In no state was there an over- all rate reduction for 
bodily injury and property damage combined . 
Automobile liability rates in North Carolina were 
for a number of years inadequate , but with two rate increases 
* 14 Page 28 . 
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in 1961, one of 6.3% effective in February, and the other of 
18.7% effective in September, it would appear that the 
problem had been alleviated. There are states, however, where 
rates are currently inadequate and rate increases are needed. 
Among these states are Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Louisi-
ana, Michigan, Minnesota, South Dakota, Tennessee and 
Wisconsin where the statistical data indicate a need for a 
private passenger car rate increase of at least 15%. The 
prospects in theses states, however, are not encouraging. 
In some rates of competitors are lower than MUtualBureau 
rates and, therefore, increases would aggravate a serious 
competitive situation. In other states there are basic 
differences in rating philosophy between Bureau representa-
tives and supervisory officials. This is especially true 
of Tennessee, where neither the National Bureau of Casualty 
Underwriters nor the MUtual Bureau has had an increase in 
nearly three years. In August, 1960, the National Bureau 
and the National Automobile Underwriters Association request-
ed approval of an increase in automobile insurance rates in 
Tennessee. 
The National Bureau's filing involved a statewide 
rate level increase of 25% for private passenger cars, 7.8% 
for commercial cars and 8.1% for garage risks. The state-
wide increase for physical damage was approximately 6% on 
the average for all coverages. After an administrative 
hearing before the Tennessee Insurance department, Commiss-
ioner John R. Long disapproved the National Bureau and the 
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N.A.U.A. filings on the grounds that dispite the showing 
that some member and subscriber companies had been losing 
money, others had shown a profit on their automobile business. 
The commissioner held that to grant a uniform increase to 
all would make some companies the recipients of a "juicy 
financial windfall." 
The National Bureau and the N.A.U.A. peitioned 
the Circuit Court to set aside the commissioner's disapproval. 
In May, 1961, Circuit Judge Byrd Douglas ordered the case 
returned to Commissioner Long for further hearing on its 
merits. Judge Douglas ruled that the commissioner's action 
in disapproving the rate filings was "arbitrary, illegal 
and in excess of his jurisdiction •• •" The Cirucit Judge 
stated that Commissioner Long did not give legal reasons for 
disapproving the filings, and he ordered the commissioner to 
consider them on their merits and either approve the filings 
or, in the case of disapproval, to specify in what respects 
the filings failed to meet the statutory requirements. 
Commissioner Long appealed to the Tennessee Supreme 
Court from the decision of Judge Douglas and in October, 1961, 
the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the lower court's 
ruling, thus upholding the commissioner and his novel 
rating theory. 
ASSIGNED RISKS 
In connection with the question of adequate rates 
in general: What about assigned risks? The most significant 
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development in connection with automobile assigned risk plans 
in recent months has been the growth of the "uniform rate" 
concept. Uniform rates for all assigned risks, including 
private passenger, are already in effect in seven states 
(Iowa, Michigan, Maryland, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina and Wisconsin) and are being considered in about 
twenty-five additional states. 
Subcommittees have been appointed by the MUtual 
Insurance Rating Bureau, National Bureau of Casualty Under-
writers and National Association of Independent Insurers to 
consider assigned risk experience periodically, and when 
experience warrants a change to submit recommendations 
relative to uniform rate level and/or surcharges, to the 
National Industry Committee on Automobile Assigned Risk Plans, 
which in turn will present them to the various Plan Govern-
ing Committees. 
However, the National Industry Committee does not 
recommend uniform rates as the sole solution to assigned 
risk rate inadequacy. An alternate uniform automobile 
assigned risk plan, referred to as Plan B, has been recom-
mended for use in those states where uniform rates are in 
effect or are being considered. Plan B. has been adopted or 
is being considered in most of the states referred to which 
are also considering uniform rates. 
Another area of significant innovation involves 
merit rating plans. In the latter part of 1959 the MUtual 
Insurance Rating Bureau introduced its "Guiding Principles 
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for Merit Rating Plans" applicable to private passenger 
automobile insurance . These guiding principles set forth 
the criteria for the development of such plans , which to 
date have led to a number of different merit rating plans 
filed by that bureau . Twenty- four member or subscriber 
companies of the bureau are using these varied plans in 
thirty-seven states . 
The merit rating plans cur rently on file on behalf 
of member and subscriber companies of the Mutual Rating 
Bureau fall into six different catagories, such as: Appli -
cation of plan for either or both liability and collision 
premiums ; ranges of credits and debits ; filings of financial 
responsiblity ; assignment of driving record points accidents 
only , or accidents and conviction basis ; and all credit types 
of merit rating plans . 
These plans are developed by any company desiring 
to use the plan in a state or states under the Mutual 
I nsurance Rating Bureau ' s jurisdiction , and may be subject 
to review by the bureau ' s merit rating plan subcommittee . 
Upon approval, it also becomes available for all members and 
subscribers of the bureau which desire to use it, providing 
notice of such intent is given to the Bureau . 
RATING PROCEDURE 
In 1961 , the National Bureau of Casualty Under-
writers introduced the following {a) rating procedure for 
automobile liability , general liability , burglary and glass 
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insurance; Risks developing $100~000. or more annual manual 
basic limits premium for automobile liability, general 
liability, burglary and glass insurance individually or in 
combination for the exposure to be insured may be (a) rated. 
In filing this rule, the National Bureau of Casualty 
Underwriters stated that: "Manual rates and standard rating 
procedure are considered appropriate for small and average--
sized risks." However, risks with substantial exposure 
developing truly sizable premiums, e.g. $100,000. annual 
manual premiums, vary markedly from the average and warrant 
self-rating of their individual characteristics. This 
principle is generally reflected in the loss rating rule of 
the composite rating plan and under experience rating plans 
where credibility increases as premium size increases. 
However, application of these plans entails considerable 
detail and expense, which will be minimized by this proposal. 
Risks with premiums exceeding $lOO,OOOper year 
invariably involve several kinds of casualty exposures in 
a number of states. The necessity of breaking down the 
experience data through the various state rating plans, many 
of which are highly complicated, is costly and time-consuming. 
As a practical matter, companies can readily determine 
appropriate premium for such sizable risks, without process-
ing the data through each rating plan otherwise applicable. 
Premiums to qualify under this rule may be developed by 
dividing losses by the expected loss ratio (as in Loss Rated 
Risks Rule 9 of the Composite Rating Plan).* 
* 14 Page 31. 
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One of the most interesting and controversial 
developments in automobile liability rating has been the 
revisions in the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters 
experience rating plans providing for an extension of 
experience and schedule rating to franchise grantees, and to 
the extension of fleet rating principles to automobiles 
owned by employees of the risk to be rated . 
A summary of the changes introduced by the 
National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters follows : 
1 . As respects the automobile liability , 
general liability. , burglary and glass 
plans , the eligibility rule has been 
amended in order to permit the combination 
of risks based solely upon management in 
those situtations where there exists "an 
exclusive franchise grantor and the other 
interests to be r ated". Such risks may be 
combined proveded : 
a . all interests operate under a common 
trade name , 
b . all interests use one or more indenti-
cal products or services obtained 
through the franchise grantor 
c . one source is responsible for payment 
of premiums and 
d • • there is no legal prohibition against 
ownership by the franchise grantor of 
the operations of the other interests 
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to be rated . The current rule permits 
combination on the bases of majority 
financial interest only. 
2. Under the automobile plans, the following 
additional changes have been introduced: 
17 
Vehicles owned by employers of an employer 
may be combined for rating with the employer's 
vehicles (including fleet rating) under 
certain perscribed conditions, which include: 
a . duties of the employee involve the use 
of motor vehicles in the business of 
the employer, 
b . business use rates apply for vehicles 
owned by employees which are included 
in the rating , 
c.employee-owned vehicles shall be 
insured under a Basic Automobile 
Liability Form, 
d . employer is responsible for premium 
payments, 
e . employee-owned vehicles are not · 
eligible for the application of any 
Safe Driver Insurance Plan and 
f.the policy shall contain a complete 
schedule of all employees and the 
vehicles owned by them which are 
combined for rating . 
Under date of November 6, 1961, the MUtual Insur-
ance Rating Bureau filed in a number of states an amendment 
to the Bureau Automobile liability experience rating plan, 
permitting the combination for experience-rating purposes 
of risks when there exist an exclusive franchise arrangement 
between the franchise grantor and the other interests involv-
ed. In addition, an amendment was filed which will permit 
the combination for rating of automobiles owned by employees 
of an employer with the employer's automobiles under certain 
conditions. 
AGENCY FILINGS 
In 1959, the MUtual Insurance Rating Bureau adopted 
a procedure for processing agency filings. An agency filing 
is a filing of rules, rates, rating plans, etc., made by the 
bureau on behalf of a single member or subscriber, rather 
than for all its members and subscribers. It differs from a 
deviation in that a deviation is filed by the ~ember or 
subscriber directly with an insurance department, and under 
the casualty rating law is limited to a flat percentage change 
in the bureau rates. A variation in a rule, classification 
system, or rating plan cannot be filed as a deviation in 
practically all states under the rate regulatory laws. The 
MUtual Insurance Bureau agency filing procedure, however, 
can service a company desiring such a variation. 
The agency filings handled by the bureau through 
October of 1961 have come within the following principal 
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catagories : 
1 . Revised private passenger age- group 
classification and revised defferentials . 
2 . Automobile liability policy programs . 
3. Amendment of automobile liability policies . 
4. Merit rating plans (all-credit type). 
5. Revised rates for private passenger cars, 
commercial cars and miscellaneous classes. 
6. Automobile Casualty Manual rule exceptions . 
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7. Automobile Liability Experience Rating Plans . 
The National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters also has made a 
number of agency filings which fall into the same principal 
catagories lis ted above . * 
The Mutual Bureau collects s tatistical data coded 
and reported under the Automobile Liability Statistical Plan. 
Consolidations of the experience so reported are filed with 
the various insurance departments for the states for which 
that bureau is an official statistical agent, and the consol-
idations are analyzed by the bureau actuarial department . 
The indicated rate changes then are presented to the auto-
mobile rating committee for consideration . The committee 
reviews the data for each state and determines whether or 
not a rate revision should be made . This review is made 
annually for basic limits rates for each major classification-
private passenger cars , commercial cars and garages . The 
increased limits tables and medical payments tables are, 
* 14 Page 33 . 
however , revised only occasionally . Until 1961 the increased 
limits tables for automobile liability had not been revised 
since February , 1952 . On September 1 , 1961 , a revised 
program for automobile liability increased limits and medical 
payments insurance became effective in most states under the 
jurisdiction of the MUtual Bureau . This program was developed 
jointly with the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and 
was based on statistical data reported to the two organiza-
tions . In effect , the changes resulted in lower factors for 
$10,000-20 , 000 . limits , and higher factors for high-limit 
combinations . The revised increased limits program will not 
produce any over- all changes in the rate level since the 
increases in premium , which will result from the higher 
factor, will offset the reduction in premium which will result 
fro~ the lower $10,000.-20 , 000 . factor. 
With respect to those states having financial 
responsiblity limits of $5 , 000. - 10 , 000 . for bodily injury 
liability, the manual rates under the revised increased 
limits program will continue to be printed on a $5 , 000.--
10,000. basis . Bodily injury increased limits tables 1, lA, 
2 and 3 are revised for these states so that lower factors 
will apply for limits of $10,000.-20,000 . 
In states where the financial responsibiity limits 
are $10 , 000 . -20 , 000 . for bodily injury liability, the manual 
rates under the new program will be printed on that basis 
and also in those states where $10 , 000 . -20,000. experience 
is available for private passenger cars , the manual rates will 
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be determined on such experience. A single bodily i njury 
increased limits table will apply for all risks. The 
printed manual $10,000.-20,000 . rates will be approximately 
5% below the present charges for this coverage. 
Under the new increased limits program the total 
number of bodily injury increased limits factors appearing 
in the Automobile Casualty Manual is reduced. Limits not 
shown in the manual appear in the Automobile Casualty Manual 
Supplementary Rating Procedures . The percentages applicable 
for the sub-basic limits have also been transferred to the 
Supplementary Rating Procedures . There have been no changes 
in the percentages applicable to property damage increased 
limits . 
With respect to medical payments insurance, Tables 
A and B are transferred from the rate section of the Auto= 
mobile Casualty Manual to the state rate sheets. The medical 
payments rates for Table A and B will vary by state in 
accoraance with the state experience on this coverage. 
VOLUNTARY RESTRICTIONS 
A very important development in automobile 
liability insurance that should be mentioned, but which is 
not directly related to the rate situation is the restric-
tion on the right of insurance companies to cancel automobile 
liability policies. Late in 1960, the MUtual Bureau, in 
cooperation with the National Bureau, developed and filed 
a program in New York by which the companies voluntarily 
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restricted their right of cancellation. Under the new 
procedure, which became effective in New York on Marchl, 1961, 
cancellation may be effected for only certain specified 
reasons. This program with only slight modifications was 
also adopted in Maryland, effective January 1, 1962. 
FUTURE DAMAGE 
Competition for business, inadequate rates, 
refined classification<.• systems, merit rating plans, vari-
ation in policy forms, increases in the number of assigned 
risks, inadequate premiums for assigned risks, politics in 
the automobile field, and a near breakdown of cooperative 
rate making are all inter-related. As companies compete for 
the most desirable business in each classification and 
territory, develop numerous classification systems, introduce 
merit rating, and become more restricted in their under-
writing, a larger and larger number of risks are forced into 
as assigned risk plan, and adequate rates for other than 
"the most desirable" risks become more and more difficult 
to obtain. The experience base for rate making becomes less 
reliable as variations in policy forms increase. Combination 
of experience becomes more and more difficult and less and 
less meaningful as classification systems multiply. Rate 
making in concert requires a high degree of uniformity in 
forms, rules, classifications and territories. With the 
trend toward independent filings, optional bureau programs, 
and agency filings, stability in the automobile rate field 
becomes more and more difficult. 
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CHAPTER III 
MULTIPLICITY OF RATES AND FORMS 
A SERIOUS THREAT TO SOLVENCY OF SMALLER COMPANIES 
With the introduction of the original safe driver 
plan in California in 1959, there were more than forty differ-
ent rating plans announced within a matter of months. Bureau 
companies, taking full advantage of the then recently granted 
liberty for experimentation, seemed to vy with one another 
in introducing separate individual programs, all adding to 
the confusion, and all placing the smaller and medium-s i zed 
companies with a large stake in the automobile underwriting 
field in a nearly untenable competitive position. 
What seems to have been overlooked in this rush for 
preferred business in the automobile field is that individual 
risks have already, in effect, been merit rated by classi-
fication and territory. Which is to say that rate adjust-
ments have been made depending upon the accident frequency in 
both territorial and occupational classifications. Therefore 
to superimpose upon this already functioning scheme of merit 
rating still another scheme based upon the accident record 
of the individual risk is almost sure to end in disaster, 
particularly, for many of the smaller companies with limited 
resources. 
It must be remembered that a properly administered 
safe driver or merit rating plan should produce no more, and 
no less, premium dollars on an over-all basis than are 
provided for in the base rate being used at the time of the 
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adoption of the plan. These plans are designed primarily to 
distribute equitably among policyholders in the automobile 
field their fair share of loss costs as determined by the 
accident record of the individual policyholder . * 
To accomplish this purpose is not an easy one, 
especially with everyone anxious to be in the preferred 
classification and even the most accident prone resisting 
anything resembling a surcharge . As a consequence, the big 
problem of the companies is to avoid turning these safe 
driver plans into an over- all reduction in the base premium 
rate . Through the years the companes have not had any great 
success in this direction . Bureau and independant companies 
have been looking for a solution to this problem of modifying 
the average class rate by recognizing the good and penalizing 
the bad drivers, through credits and debits from the average, 
for a period of some thirty years . And practically all the 
plans embarked upon , including the four plans sponsored in 
past years by the bureaus , have had to be withdrawn because 
they proved unworkable . 
Whether these latter-day plans are different in 
that the credits and debits are assigned on the basis of 
public records in the offices of the various Registrars of 
Motor Vehicles will make surcharges more acceptable to those 
who have accidents remains to be seen . An important question 
is whether the larger companies are going to discover this 
before the way is strewn with failures of the ~maller weaker 
organizations which will be the first to bow to what history 
* 21 Page III . 
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has so clearly proved, that merit rating on an accident basis 
is tantamount to a tacit reduction in the over-all base rate, 
a situation which is extremely dangerous when the base rate 
is not adequate to begin with. Furthermore, safe driver 
plans, whether based upon public records or not, are expensive 
to operate, a factor which cannot be forgotten in weighing 
the prospects of the smaller companies where automobile 




HISTORY OF MERIT RATING 
The efforts of insurers to apply the principles of 
experience rating to individual private passenger automobile 
liability risks is not hard to understand if the competitive 
situation in the automobile liability field is taken into 
consideration . Companies have for years tried to increase 
the ratio of insured owners, worried about compulsory or 
state automobile insurance and apparently accepted the 
theory of the average American driver that not only is he 
a preferred risk , but that insurance premiums can be success-
fully used to encourage safety and punish poor drivers. 
Individual automobile experience rating is one of several 
devices that have been tried by insurers , particular~y 
stock companies, with the prime objective of raising the 
proportion of insured to total owners : installment premiums, 
refinements of the classification system and the $1000. limit 
policy are examples . Pressure for these plans grow especially 
when automobile liability rates rise rapidly and prospects 
grow more selective of their insurers , and insurers grow more 
selective of their prospects as was the case after World 
War II . 
Individual risk experience rating plans for the 
single automobile may be classified under three heading, 
first on the basis of the psychology underlying the plan, 
it may be one of merit or of demerit rating . Merit rating 
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gives a reward or credit on the manual rate to the individ-
ual insured who qualifies on the basis of his driving record; 
demerit rating grew out of the system of penalties imposed 
under financial responsibility laws and penalized the indivi-
dual insured by means of a debit to the manual rate of the 
insured if his driving record is poor . The basis for the 
experience standard by which a driving record is measured 
may include only accidents for which the insured is held 
liable or on all accidents regardless of blame or claim. On 
the app~ication completed by the insured for a company we 
find whether the plan gives a debit or credit on the premium 
for the next policy period or whether a cash adjustment is 
made at the end of the expiring policy period . As a practi-
cal matter the insurance company does not have a completely 
free choice among plan features . It would not be practicable 
to combine demerit rating with a retrospective application 
whereby a casp adjustment is made at the end of the policy 
period. One of the main appeals of the prospective approach 
whereby a credit or debit is applied for the next policy 
period is the supposed incentive to the insured to stay with 
this current insurance company . 
Through the past years there have been many attempts 
at individual automobile experience rating. "The National 
Bureau prospective no- blame merit plan of 1929- 1932; the 
Nation Bureau prospective no- blame demerit plan of 1932-
(withdrawn the day it was promulgated because of agent 
opposition) ; the National Bureau Safe Driver Reward Plan of 
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1938- 1942 , a retrospective no- blame merit plan ; the New 
York State Preferred Risk plan for the same period (prospec-
tive no- blame demerit) ; and finally the New York prospective 
no- blame demerit plan effective since November l , 1952- -not 
to mention the considerable number of individual insurer 
plans- provide evidence that the subject has been, and is, a 
live one ."* 
Criticisms of individual risk rating for the 
individual automobile fall under two heads . They are 
actuarial- statistical , the more basic , and administrative , 
Regarding the actuarial- statistical the weakness of a single 
automobile as the exposure unit over an experience period of 
one or two years seems to need little discussion as to its 
value. The New York plan , effective November l, 1952, 
required only 18 months for the experience period although 
some plans requireq periods up to three years and some as 
little as 9 months or a year . "Tpe credibility weight 
given the smallest fleet is 5 percent ; The credibility weight 
for a single automobile for a single year , with an average 
claim frequency of 2 . 7 percent for bodily injury and 10. 3 per-
cent for property damage liability , is very much less . 
Adding the two , the average annual frequency is one in nine 
or ten risks . The frequency would be somewhat higher for 
longer periods , but ' Even the risk that goes as long as 9 6r 
10 years without producing a loss is still only an average 
* I Page 512 . 
risk"* • Under this New York Plan the individual insured who 
did not have an accident or only one property damage liability 
actident paid only the manual premium . If the insured had 
one bodily injury accident or one bodily injury and one 
property damage liability accident , or two property damage 
accidents paid a 10 percent surchage on the manual rate . 
The insured with a poorer record paid a 20 percent surcharge 
on the manual rate . 
This is not a plan of experience rating when it 
has been stated by the Bureau that "the element of chance 
overshadows a credibility expectancy ,"** then any system of 
credit and debit produces an arbitrary allocation of loss 
costs . This arbitrariness is compounded when , as has been 
the case with merit rating plans that the manual rates are 
first increased by an amount sufficient to make it possible 
to pay back a reward to 90 percent of the insured risks with 
a clear driving record in a given year , this is assuming a 
frequency of one in ten . If we a s sume a $48. annual mannal 
rate before experience rating and a 10 percent reward for 
the 90 percent of those with no driving or accident rate 
then the manual rate will have to be raised from $4$ . to 
$52 . 75 . From this new rate the record and accident-free 
insured would receive a return of $5 . 28 , of which he himself 
has contributed $4.75 , or all but 53 cents. If the experience 
period were two years , the contribution of the accident-- free 
* I page 513 . 
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insured would be $4 . 18 of a rate level increase of $5.82 . * 
If this be the case then the incentive to safe driving in 
such a plan must be imaginary for it certainly would not be 
financial . 
The National Bureau has suggested that a " question 
may arise as to the soundness of panalizing • • • an insured when 
he is unfortunate enough to have an accident for which he is 
insuring against . " This appears to be a suggestion that the 
basic cause of automobile accidents is social and not person-
al . 
Another strange actuarial objection stated by the 
bureau is that "Unfair discrimination may be alledged if a 
penalty plan were not to discr iminate with respect to the 
seriousness of an accident." While the insurance companies 
concern regarding this would be primarily over the adminis-
trative problems that would result from such a plan which 
distinguished between small and large losses, the inference 
is that accident severity and not frequency should determine 
premiums . This would increase the element of pure chance as 
a rate factor and run counter to sound rate- making practice 
both for classifications and for individual risks . These 
administrative objections of the insurance companies appear 
larger than those of an actuarial- statistical nature . The 
Bureau listed approximately 20 of these objections. Some of 
the more important , particularly for multi- insurer plans are 
delays that result from the transfer of records between 
*I Page 514 . 
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insurance companies which is often due to the reluctance of 
the current insurer to give out the information to another 
prospective carrier . Other delays result from the need to 
determine liability or definite loss amounts , for the 
issuance of renewals and for the necessity of securing out 
of state accident data . There is additional administrative 
expense for insurer and state . " I n anno~ing his decision 
in 1945 not to reinstate the Preferred Risk Rating Plan 
effective in New York from 1938 to 1942, Superintendent 
Dineen reported that ' Surcharges were imposed on only slightly 
more than 3 percent of the cars and the administrative cost 
involved in applying the plan f ar outweighed any benefits 
derived" •• * 
As a further point there is no evidence that 
individual automobile rating plans have had any effect on 
highway safety . In the rating up process that precedes 
application of merit rating there is a strong inference to 
the contrary. 
To summarize , individua l automobile experience 
rating is defective in the actuarial sense because the 
individual automobile is not a proper rating unit . This 
weakness has been made even more important due to the 
attempts of insurance companies to not only equalize rates 
but also to carry out at the same time other conflicting 
objectives such a hazard prevention and that of getting new 
business and retaining what they have . It might be more 
*I Page 514 . 
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accurate to say that these plans began as a result of the 
desire of insurance companies to get business and reduce 
hazards . The technical and practical sides cannot be 
separated for the conditions that l ead to the plans in the 
first place affect ther technical soundness , but also 
affect their day- to- day effectiveness . The failure of the 
plans to meet the requirements of sound experience rating 
is inherent , although it should be stated that the area of 
inequity is less in the demerit plans . The demerit plans 
have less appeal for both agent and insured . 
This does not mean that individual car experience 
will not continue to be used as a rate- setting device either 
with or without classification systems with vary degrees of 
refinement . There is no technical reason why individual 
automobile loss record should not be made the basis of 
classification , provtded it meets minimum credibility 
standards . The question is whether individual automobile 
experience is a basis of classifications actuarially valid 
and administratively workable . "The first plan of the 
National Bureau ' ended in failure , due not only to the fact 
that approximately SO percent of all risks were entitled to 
the 10 percent credit provided under the plan, but also 
because a large proportion of the remaining 20 percent were 
given the credit more or less illegitimately. This plan 
failed as experience rating because credits were given to too 
high a proportion of insured risks and were so crude that 
the plan lost all semblance of one for select risks (the 
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aver age insured is not made select by calling him so . ) It 
failed as a basis of classification because insurers found 
they could not rely on agent or insured for an honest and 
complete loss record"* 
Superintendent Pink of New York refused to approve 
the Safe Driver Reward Plan in that state in 1938. He 
referred to both weaknesses stating "the basic difficulty 
with any plan of merit rating of private passenger automobiles 
is that about 9 out of 10 motorists are entitled to the 
discount which is offered for safe driving and freedom from 
claims . This makes it practically a matter of general rate 
reduction rather than a reward . ** 
As most of us , Mr . Pink wanted to see automobile 
accidents reduced, but "the prevention of accidents is one 
thing , the establishment of proper and scientific premium 
:Cates is something different . " He concluded that "I do not 
think that a rating plan should go beyond the reward which 
comes from accurate measurement of hazard . To make rewards 
or penalties which are unjustified by loss experience of 
hazards opens the way to all kinds of abuses." If as has 
been maintanied , "It may be properly said that by setting up 
merit rating for private passenger automobiles we merely 
create another classification (sic) , one being lucky drivers , 
the other unlucky drivers**an even more serious question is 
raised . 
*I Page 515 . 
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These weaknesses and abus es are particulary 
characteristic of multi - insurer plans . The success of 
certain individual insurance company plans , under controls 
impossible for the majority of insurance companies, particu-
larly stock companies , appears to provide evidence not so 
much of the validity of a rating scheme as of the strengbh 
of an underwriting department . 
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CHAPTER V 
SAFE DRIVER PLANS 
The safe Driver Insurance Plan, introduced by 
National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and National Auto-
mobile Underwriters Association in California in the spring 
of 1959, has spread, with a series of innovations, to a 
number of other states and has become an important feature 
of the present Automobile picture . Fundamently, it bases 
private passenger Automobile rates upon the individual 
driving records of the insured and operators who live with 
him-convictions and accidents, the latter, in some cases, 
regardless of liability. 
Under present rules, use of the Safe Driver plan 
is mandatory wherever the Special Automobile policy is used. 
It is not, however, confined to use with this contract. There 
are exceptions in the states of Indiana and New Mexico where 
the Special policy has been approved but the Safe Driver 
plan has not. In practice the Safe Driver plan has been 
widely used with the Family Automobile policy. In states 
where the Special policy is in force, the rules provide that, 
if a company uses this contract, it must apply the Safe Driver 
plan to all eligible risks, including those insured under the 
~ 
Family, Basic and other Automobile policies. If a company 
does not tlse the Special policy, it may or may not use the 
Safe Driver plan, but the rules require that the plan be 
either used or not used on all eligible risks. It is not 
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intended that a company shall use it for some eligible insureds 
in a particular state and not for others. In some states, 
the plan does not apply to assigned risks. 
Rate reductions and increases under the Safe 
Driver plan apply to Bodily Injury and Property Damage 
Liability, Medical Payments and Collision insurance but not 
to Comprehensive Physical Damage , Fire and Theft, Uninsured 
Motorist and other coverages . This is true of most like 
independent plans . 
The plan as originally filed in California is 
substantially the same as that in states in which it was 
later introduced , but there are some important differences. 
Variations by states generally involve: (1) the length of the 
experience period-the time during which convictions and 
accidents are counted; (2) treatment of inexperienced drivers; 
(3) the number of points assigned for accidents; (4) the 
number of points assigned for moving traffic violations; (5) 
the type of convictions for which points are charged; (6) the 
credit for insureds with no points or only one point in the 
family; (7) the maximum surcharge imposed, and (8) the effect 
of incorrect information given with the application 
HOW POINTS ARE DETERMINED 
Technically, the rate is based on the number of 
"driving record points" charged to the risk. These points 
are determined by the number of certain convictions and 
accidents arising out of use of a private passenger type 
automobile-not necessarily owned by the insured or covered 
by the policy--involving the insured and any operator of the 
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automobile "resident in the same household," during a design-
ated experience period. 
The experience period varies. In most states the 
experience period is the three year period immediately 
preceding the date of application or the preparation of the 
renewal. In other states, it is the ~ or three year 
period ending three months prior to the effective date of 
the policy. Generally, those states which charge five points 
for major violations follow the second approach. 
CONVICTION POINTS VARY 
The number of points is not the same for each 
conviction. There are a number of different conviction 
point schedules in the various states. The differences in 
conviction point schedules stem usually from the methods 
used by the separate states to record convictions of moving 
traffic violations and in the terminology employed. Certain 
states, for example, do not use officially the term "reckless 
driving." So, while this is a chargeable offense in some 
states, it is not mentioned specifically in others. 
In most states, three points are charged for a 
conviction of driving while intoxicated or under the influence 
of drugs; failure to stop and report when involved in an 
accident; homicide or assualt arising out of the operation 
of a motor vehicle, or driving while the operators license 
has been suspended or revoked. 
Two points are charged for the accumulation of 
points under a state point system or a series of violations 
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requiring a financial responsibility filing . 
One point is assigned for conviction of any other 
violation as a result of which an operator ' s license was 
suspended or revoked or a financial responsibility filing 
was required as of the effective date of the policy. 
IMPORTANT CONVICTION EXCEPTIONS 
In certain other states , an entirely different 
schedule of conviction points is used . In these states, five 
points are charged for a conviction of driving while intoxi--
cated or under the influence of drugs ; failure to stop and 
report when in an accident , etc . Three points are charged 
for a conviction of reckless driving and one point for any 
other conviction of a moving violation . Illegal parking, of 
course , is not a moving violation . The rules also state that 
convictions involving inadequate muffler or excessive escape 
of exhaust products , defective lights or other equipment--
except brakes- failure to sign or display registration card, 
display of license plates and failure to have one ' s driver's 
license in possession (provided the person actually has a 
valid license at the time l shall not cause any points to be 
charged . 
ACCIDENT POINTS 
For each accident, while operating any private 
passenger type automobile , resulting in damage to property, 
including that of the operator , of more than $50 , or in 
bodily injury or death , one point is charged . In most states 
one point is assigned if , during the experience period, there 
were two or more accidents eausing property damage of $50 or 
less . 
In some states two points are charged for each 
accident . In these states , there is no penalty for two or 
more accidents involving damage of $50 or less . In a few 
other states which use the original version of the Safe 
Driver Plan , there is no penalty for two or more minor 
accidents even though only one point is charged for each 
accident 
ACCIDENTS NOT CHARGED 
The rules establish a number of circumstances 
under which no accident point will be charged . Since they 
refer to an accident "while operating" an automobile, an 
incident such as slamming a door on a person ' s hand- even if 
it should result in liability- does not accumulate a point . 
Further , the rules state that no points shall be charged 
for accidents under the following circumstances : 
1 . If the automobile is legally parked . 
2 . If the insured , the resident operator of the 
owner of property involved is reimbursed 
"by or on behalf of" a person responsible 
for the accident or gets a judgment against 
that party (collectible or not) 
3 . If the automobile is struck in the rear by 
another automobile and the insured or 
operator is not convicted of a moving 
violation as a result of the accident. 
4. If the operator of another automobile 
involved in the accident is convicted of 
a moving violation as a result of the 
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accident and the insured or resident 
operator is not convicted . 
5. If an automobile operated by the insured 
or a resident operator is damaged by a 
"hit and run" driver, provided the accident 
is reported to the proper authorities 
within 24 hours . * 
Otherwise , each accident calls for the designated 
charge, even if the insured or member of his family is not 
liable and is not convicted of anything. An example would 
be an accident involving disputed right of way, neither 
party being cited by the police- or the case being dismissed--
and neither party being able to collect from the other or to 
establish liability. 
WHEN POINTS ARE CUMULATIVE 
In states where one point is charged for each 
accident, any points for a conviction arising out of the 
same accident are also charged. If the insured, for example, 
has an accident and is convicted of failing to yield right 
of way , he is charged two points . In states where two 
points are charged for an accident , no charge is made for a 
one point conviction involving the same circumstances . Thus, 
in the example just discussed , the charge-two points-is the 
same in all states . This, however , does not apply to con-
viction of a more serious offense . If the insured has an 
accident and is also convicted of drunken driving, he is 
charged--depending upon the state--a total of four or seven 
points . 
* 19 Page 30. 
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There is no penalty or surcharge for having an 
inexperienced driver in the family . However , in most states , 
no credit or discount is applied unless the applicant or 
principal operator has been licensed during the full experience 
period . The plan in these states provides that if no points 
have been assigned , but if the applicant or principal operator 
has not been licensed during the full experience period , the 
automobile is rated at the appropriate basic premiums. State 
by state variation on this point is indicated in the table . 
DISCOUNTS AND SURCHARGES 
The number of points accumulated by the risk--
insured and resident operators combined--determines the 
"driving record sub- classification." The number of classes 
varies . In states which use a 3- 2- l point violation schedule, 
there is only one discounted sub- classification and four 
sub- classes which are surchared . 
The classes , with appropriated discounts or sur-


















~aximum surcharge varies 
Note that under this commonly used plan there is 
no sub- classification calling for payment of the basic rate . 
Every risk is either discounted or surcharged. The maximum 
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surcharges under this approach are considerably higher than 
they were originally under the California plan . Note, too , 
that the surcharges increase sharply for each point . As the 
plan was originally filed in California, and is used in those 
states which use a 5- 3- 1 point violation schedule, there are 
seven sub-classifications . 
Points Sub- Class Differential 
0 0 ... ..,.. 
1 1 + 
2 2 Standard Premium 
3 3 +20% 
4 4 +40% 
5 5 +70% 
6 6 +100% 
The manual does not specify percentages of increase 
and reduction , but the effect is as shown here . Instead, 
there is in the exception sheets for each state in which the 
Safe Driver plan is in force, a table headed "Master Driving 
Record Rates ." This shows standard premiums-ref-Erred to in 
this part of the manual as "basic rate" - and the actual 
premium to be charged in each case for each sub-classifica-
tion . Increases and reductions are superimposed upon the 
premium which would otherwise be applicable. 
Any surcharge brought about by an assigned risk 
plan is also included . The manual exception sheets for the 
state in question show the application of each classification 
to different basic rates . 
* Risks in this class pay a standard premium reduced by a 
percentage which varies by state . 
+ The standard premium is reduced , but not as much as with 
Class 0 . 
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If the insured owns two or more automobiles 
eligible- for this rating plan , and they are insured in the 
same policy , the "points " are applied only to that taking 
the higher or highest rate and any others are rated as though 
there were no convictions or accidents . 
In those states in which basic rates are used when 
no points have been assigned but the applicant or principal 
operator has not been licensed for the full experience 
period , the rule applying to "two or more automobiles " is 
amended so that for these "experienced" drivers only the 
automobile taking the highest basic premium is rated at that 
basic premium and all other automobiles are assigned to 
sub- class 0 . 
If a member of the insured ' s household- other than 
spouse- owns his own automobile , his is ordinarily not an 
operator of the insured ' s automobile and hence his accident 
and conviction record may be disregarded in rating the 
insured ' s automobile . Occasional operation of the insured ' s 
automobile by this person should not cause difficulty . If , 
however , this person actually does operate the family auto-
mobile regularly , an underwriter would undoubtedly be justi-
fied in including his record . If a member of the household 
is away with the armed forces , his record is not counted , 
unless he customarily operated the automobile , but the record 
of any member away at school is included . 
A signed application is required . This calls for 
information on matters which affect rate determination under 
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the plan . The signature of the applicant on all applications 
received from an agent , broker or solicitor must be certified 
by such agent , broker or solicitor . 
In many states, the information necessary to assign 
the proper renewal sub- classification must be obtained by 
means of another application, signed personally by the 
insured or on his behalf by the producer , covering the 
records of all operators of the vehicle for the immediate 
past year . If the renewal application is not signed persona-
lly by the insured, it must be supplemented by motor vehicle 
department records and the com~ny ' s accident records . In 
most states , the application states clearly that the applicant 
offers his statements to the insurance company as an induce-
ment to issue insurance . Incorrect information can void 
coverage . 
There are , however, a few exceptions to this • •• In 
some states , the rules provide for a money penalty-in addit--
ion to the difference between the correct premiums and what 
actually was charged . In other states- except for the remote 
chance of establishing outright fraud- it appears that an 
incorrect statement about accident , convictions etc . , will 
not impair coverage . 
Accidents are considered for rating purposes only 
if they involve operation of a "private passenger type 
automobile . " As to convictions , there is state variation . 
In some states , only those involving operation of private 
passenger automobiles are counted . In most states, however , 
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all chargeable convictions- regardless of the type of vehicle 
involved- are counted . Ther term "private passenger type 
automobile'' is defined as meaning a four wheel automobile of 
the private passenger, station wagon or jeep type and an 
automobile of the truck type- not restricted to specific body 
styles- with a load capacity of 1 , 500 pounds or less not used 
for business or commercial purposes other than farming. 
Hence any accidents which the insured or a member of his 
family may have had while driving a heavy commercial auto-
mobile for business purposes , regardless of ownership, are 
disregarded . The plan does not include incidents arising out 
of the operation of motorcycles , motor scooters and the like . 
Note that the plan refers to use of any automobile 
of the "private passenger type ." It is not restricted to 
automobiles insured under the policy or those owned by the 
insured . An accident or conviction arising out of the 
insured or a member of his family driving a private passenger 
type automobile owned by another~culding his employer 
(exception Texas)-counts in this plan. On the other hand, if 
someone- not a member of the insured ' s household- is involved 
in an accident while driving the insured ' s automobile, this 
accident is not charged against the insured . It would 
affect that person ' s or his family ' s rating , if there is an 
insured automobile in his family . 
In most stanes, the plan now applies to any private 
passenger automobile owned by an individual or by "two or 
more related individuals who are residents of the same 
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household"-thus including automobi les owned , for example, by 
two brothers, as well as those owned jointly by husband and 
wife . An eligilbe automobile is one which has four wheels 
and is classified and rated as a private passenger auto-
mobile- thus including utility automobiles or a farmer ' s 
truck with a load capacity of 1 , 500 pounds or less and rated 
as a private passenger automobile . Fleets of automobiles 
insured under a fleet plan- even if owned by individuals and 
meeting the physical qulaifications- are not eligilbe for 
Safe Driver rating treatment . 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE BEGINNING OF COMPULSORY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
There was not much need to worry about any form of 
automobile liability insurance in the early days of American 
motor car . In 1905 , for example, there were only 5,422 cars 
registered in the whole Commonwealth of Massachusetts . Ten 
years later this figure had jumped to the astonishing total 
of 112 , 153 . The year 1920 arrived , World War I had ended, 
and 319 , 774 cars were on the road in the Commonwealth . The 
horse and buggy days were over and the American automobile 
had gone into mass production. 
Along with this remarkable advance of motoring, 
however , an increasingly dist~rbing problem presented itself. 
Too many people were being killed or injured in automobile 
accidents , most of them by motorists who were both uninsured 
and otherwise financially irresponsible. 
Prior to 1925 , the Massachusetts Legislanre created 
a special commission to study the whole problem and to develop 
a highway safety program. This , together with related 
occurrences of the day , is perhaps of little consequence now. 
Suffice it to say that it was the findings of this recess 
commission which led to the enactment of the Massachusetts 
Compulsory Automobile Liability IHsur ance Act in 1925, to 
become effective on January 1, 1927 . 
The law compelled the owner of a motor vehicle , as 
a condition precedent to obtaining his registration , to 
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purchase liability insurance protecting him against damages 
up to $5,000 for death or injury to one person in any one 
accident and up to $10,000 for death or injury to more than 
me person in any one accident upon the ways of the Common-
wealth. As orighally enacted, the law provided similar 
coverage for guest occupants, but this provision in 1936 
was removed from the compulsory act . 
These, then, were merely the law's requirements 
of motorists registering their cars. But in the early days, 
as now, the primary difficulties arose from those provisions 
dealing with the administration of the compulsory system. 
The act designated the State Commissioner of In-
surance, and not the insurance companies, as the sole author--
ity not only for setting the compulsory insurance rates but 
also for determining which rating systems and classifications 
to use . 
This feature of the act, appointing the Commissioner 
as the sole rate making authority , automatically plunged the 
whole administration of Massachusetts compulsory insurance 
into politics, where it has remained ever since. 
The inevitable relationship between state-made 
rates and politics asserted itself in 1928, only a year after 
the compulsory act was in operation. In that year of both 
state and national elections, Governor Alvan T. Fuller 
ordered Commissioner Wesley Monk to reduce the rates for 
1929 by cutting the value of outstanding claims by an 
arbitrary 25 percent. 
Mr. Monk refused to comply and resigned on 
September 1, 1928, stating that the governor was engaged 
in "an attempt to solve a mathematical problem by the intro-
duction of a factor of political expediency" ••• which was 
"neither right nor proper" . * 
However sound Mr . Monk's principles may have been, 
politics won out in the end . Nearly three months later an 
acting Commissioner set new rates , reduced by some 10 percent. 
One of the foremost public misconceptions about 
the law is the notion that it is the insurance companies which 
set the rates for compulsory insurance . Of course the In-
surance Commissioner sets these rates, and always has. Under 
the las he possesses complete and exclusive authority in 
this respect . In nearly all other states the rates for 
automobile liability insurance for death and injury are set 
by the insurance companies , subject to the approval of state 
regulatory authori~s . This is even true under the New York 
compulsory automobile insurance law , which became effective 
in February of 1957 . New York , incidentally, after having 
had the opportunity to witness the Massachusetts system in 
operation for nearly 30 years, became the second state in 
the nation to embrace compulsory insurance . North Carolina 
subsequently enacted a compulsory law, effective January 1, 
1958 , but with a provision that it expire in 1961 , unless 
renewed by the Legislature . 
It is obvious that the Legislature ' s decision to 
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designate the Commissioner as the sole rate- making authority 
automatically set the Commissioner up as a political target . 
Massachusetts has had many able Insurance Commiss-
ioners . But each one has been a political appointee, 
nominated by the Governor . And by reason of being a political 
appointee each Commissioner has found himself subjected to 
the most obstinate and improper of pressures , mainly from 
legislators but occasionally from the executive branch of 
the government . These pressures , notwithstanding rising 
accident claim frequencies and claim costs , have always 
been toward keeping compulsory insurance rates down to 
levels which may be politically palatable , especially in an 
election year . 
When Massachusetts was originally faced with the 
proposition of establishing rates for the newly enacted law, 
the Commissioner of Insurance promulgated purely arbitrary 
rates . In the Boston metropolitan district he took the rates 
for private passenger cars then in force by the companies and 
under which they were only about breaking even, and reducing 
them something like 331/3 per cent , issued them as the rates 
to be charged under the new law . Under the new law the 
insurance companies were compelled to accept any and all 
risks, bad as well as good , and the rates had been arbitra-
rily reduced one- third . It was inevitable and obvious to 
the insurance companies that the premium income would be 
inadequate to pay for all the losses and expenses of doing 
business in this particular territory. The rates not only 
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would not be adequate to pay for all the losses but they 
certainly did not leave anything for acquistion costs in the 
form of advertising or commissions to agents . The expenses , 
which it was argued would be less because the motorists 
would be compelled to take out the insurance whether they 
desired to or not , actually became larger , because of the 
added confusion and ignorance of the car owners . In fact , 
if the companies and their representatives had not voluntarily 
given their services to straighten out the tangle, it is 
doubtful if the act could have been put into actual force 
~r another year . 
Unfamiliarity with insurance and ignorance of the 
business led to many ridiculous misstatements in daily papers 
during this period , in discussions of compulsory automobile 
liability rates . Perhaps none was more flagrant than one 
contained in a Boston editorial which declared the companies 
had made a net profit of 21 percent on the business in 
Winthrop because the loss ratio in that city was 79 percent . 
The 79 percent represented 79 percent of the premium spent 
for losses . Out of the 21 percent l eft the agents of the 
companies received a commission of 15 percent for writing the 
business . Deducted , this would leave the companies themselves 
6 percent , out of which would have to be paid all expenses , 
rents , taxes , salaries , etc. , innumerable, and then take care 
of the "profit" . 
The law direct the Commissioner to set compulsory 
rates for the following year on or about September 15 . This 
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has become an extremely inconvenient date in the even years 
because election campaigns are usually well under way by this 
time . When it is apparent that the Commissioner has no course 
but to announce a rate increase , the party in power becomes 
uneasy and fearful that such an announcement will endanger 
its prospects of being returnedm office . It is here that 
the pressure is brought to bear , with the result that if the 
increase is announced before the election, it usually is a 
token increase , tailored to suit the electorate ' s point of 
resistance . Either that , or the rates announcement is held 
up until after the election. 
Politics has thus become the controlling factor 
in rate- making under the Massachusetts compulsory system, 
rather than cold , impartial actuarial analysis . This state 
of affairs is practically non- existent in other states, where 
rates are either increased or decreased from time to time in 
orderly , businesslike fashion , under the supervision of the 
Commissioner or other regulatory body . 
The statute requires the Commissioner to hold a 
p~blic hearing between the date on which he announces his 
proposed compulsory rates and the date on which he officially 
promulgates them. 
As conceived by the Legislature in 1925 , these 
hearing were to have served as dignified , quasi - judicial 
proceedings to assist the Commissioner in determining his 
official compulsory rates . They were intended to provide 
an opportunity for the Insurance Department to present 
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testimony and exhibits in support of the Commissioner's 
proposed rates, with the insurance companies in turn present-
ing evidence to sustain whatever rates they had recommended. 
The general public, of course, was invited to present its 
views and to give the Commissioner any pertinent testimony 
to aid him in his final determination of the rates. 
This may have been the intent of the Legislature, 
but anyone familiar with the conduct of these hearings knows 
that, aside from providing an official stenographic record, 
they have become as worthless as they are disorderly. 
Members of the general public rarely attend the 
hearings at all, which leaves a clear road for a few head-
line-hunting individuals to turn the proceedings into a 
bedlam of irrelevancy and invective . 
These annual episodes have done more to confuse and 
distort public thinking than any other administrative fundtion 
which must be carried out under the provisions of the compul-
sory law. And as a cumulative result, the integrity of the 
casualty insurance industry has suffered greatly in ~~ssach­
usetts. 
The New York compulsory law does not permit any 
person to walk in off the street and use the serious occasion 
of making automobile insurance rates as a sounding board 
for irresponsible statements to gain publicity. Instead, 
New York has a sound and orderly procedural system providing 
for the approval of disapproval of the compulsory automobile 




PROPOSED INNOVATIONS EXPLORED 
Historically, the Massachusetts compulsory system 
has passed from one crisis to another since 1927, yet 
frequently some individual or group comes forward with propos-
als which would make its operation still more difficult . Any-
one has the right of free petition to the Massachusetts 
Legislature , and many of these advocates are obviously well-
intentioned . Others are not . 
would : 
Some of these proposals advanced from time to time 
1 . Permit the sale of compulsory insurance at 
rates lower than those set by the Insurance 
Commissioner . 
2 . Insure the driver instead of the car . 
3 . Insert a $50 or $100 deductible clause in 
compulsory policies . 
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4. Establish an individual merit rating system. * 
Legislation calling for such a plan usually 
stipulates that compulsory rates set by the Commissioner shall 
be the "maximum" rates but that no insurance company "shall 
be prohibited from selling insurance for less than the 
Maximum rate ." 
These measures are referred to generally as"cut 
rate " bills . More properly, however , they should be described 
as bills which would increase compulsory rates drastically 
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for the overwhelming majority of Massachusetts motorists. 
Generally speaking, these bills would allow a 
company to set a different rate for each individual car it 
insured, provided each rate was not in excess of the Commiss-
ioner's rates. Or a company could establish innumerable 
rating classifications not presently authorized. Our present 
rating laws, of couse, delegate to the Commissioner exclusively 
the power to set rates and to establish classifications of 
risks for compulsory insurance. 
The rates and classifications of risks established 
by the Commissioner are supposed to be calculated to provide 
sufficient funds for the payment of anticipated accident 
claim losses. Therefore, reduced rates for some motorists 
under a "cut rate" law obviously would have to be offset by 
increased rates for other motorists if the aggregate premium 
revenue were to be sufficient to meet those anticipated losses. 
But these "cut rate" proposals, by declaring the 
Commissioner's rates to be the maximum ones permissible, 
clearly prohibit any offsetting increases in rates, despite 
their clear necessity. Such a law, therefore, would nullify 
the present strict statutory mandates that classifications 
be "fair" and "reasonable" and that accompanying rate 
schedules be "adequate, just, reasonable and non-discrimina-
tory". 
Sponsors of "cut rate" bills make two claims for 
their proposal: 
1. They argue that such a law would bring about 
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free and intense competition among the 
companies and thus reduce rates automatic-
ally . 
2 . They argue that it would provide a feasible 
method of individual merit rating . * 
Neither of these claims stand up under analysis . 
As to the first claim , it ought to be obvious to anyone that 
the staggering cost involved in setting up an individual 
rate for approximately 1 , 500 , 000 car- owners would alone 
ultimately cause an increase in the established rates 
rather than the decrease wnich the sponsors claims would 
occur . 
Instead of bringing about an automatic rate 
reduction through "free competition~ among the companies now 
writing compulsory insurance in Massachusetts , such a law 
would pave the way for a few foreign specialty companies to 
rush into the Commonwealth to "skim off the cream" by taking 
all the so- called "good risks" at reduced rates . 
As a result , all the poorer risks would be dumped 
on a market either unwilling or unable to absorb them because 
of the impossibility of getting an adequate rate to cover the 
loss cost expectancy of such risks . 
As to the second claim of the sponsors , the best 
answer is that no one in the past 40 years, either within 
or outside the insurance industry , has been able to devise 
a satisf actory individual merit rating plan that would reward 
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good drivers . The obvious reason lies in the mathematical 
fact that 93 percent of our motorists are accident-free in 
any given year . 
Consequently , any reward could never amount to much 
because it necessarily would have to be extracted from the 
remaining 7 percent who were involved in accidents . This 
group eventually would be forced off the road entirely, due 
~ the astronomical premium charges that would have to be 
levied on them to pay for a reward to the overwhelming 
multitude of accident- free motorists . 
The end result of indiscriminate rate cutting 
would be a chaotic state of affairs in which hundreds of 
thousands of motorists would be unable to find a company 
willing to cover them except under compulsion , such as 
through t. the Assigned Risk Plan. 
Actually , only a few of the larger companies 
could survive under so discriminatory a law . The smaller 
companies in a relatively short time would be squeezed out 
of business , causing unemployment for thousands . 
It would also wipe out vast numbers of agents 
and brokers , not only because of the insurmountable physical 
problem of determining individual rates for thousands of 
car- owners , but also because of the immense amount of ill--
will that would be generated out of hand- picking individual 
clients for tailor- made rate reductions . 
The chief argument in favor of insuring the driver 
instead of the car is that it would reduce insurance costs 
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considerably, the contention being that since there are far 
more licensed drivers than registered motor vehicles, the 
cost could be spread over a greater area . 
The 1957 figures in Massachusetts show that there 
were about 2 , 150, 000 licensed drivers and about 1,500 , 00 
registered vehicles of all descriptions . Consequently, it 
would be argued that the premium charge for driver insurance 
would be only 70 percent of the present rate . 
Dealing with this problem is somewhat difficult 
at best because not even those who favor insuring the driver 
are precisely certain of what they wish to accomplish . Some 
want to insure the drivers of all types of motor vehicles . 
Others would insure only the drivers of private passenger 
cars . Still others would insure the driver for compulsory 
(bodily injury) coverage , but would continue to insure the 
vehicle for property damage insurance . 
To give first consideration to the political 
aspects of any such plan , which is often the only practical 
approach to automobile insurance problems in Massachusetts , 
there are at least two monumental obstacles to adoption of 
driver insurance, 
The first is that it would compel more than a half-
million additional motorists in Massachusetts to buy the 
coverage a step from which legislators would recoil auto-
matically . 
The second consideration is that most families in 
Massachusetts have only one car but with several members of 
the family operating it . The additional cost to the family 
of insuring each member who operated the car would thus 
greatly exceed the present cost of insurance written on a 
specified car basis . 
Insuring the driver instead of the car is not new 
in concept or in practice . As far back as 1915 this type of 
insurance was sold to the owner of a car with separate prem-
ium charges for each and every additional operator . The 
plan was found unworkable, and in 1920 was replaced by the 
specified car basis . 
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
considered the question as recently as 1954 but decided to 
pigeon- hole the matter indefinitely . 
There can be no doubt that the int roduction of 
driver insurance would load Massachusetts highways with 
uninsured motorists . 
The compulsory law requires car-owners to establish 
their financial responsibility before obtaining their regis-
tration certificates by (1) purchasing bodily injury liability 
insurance, by (2) posting a bond in accordance with the 
statute or by (3) depositing cash or negotiable securities 
with the Commonwealth . 
The mere presence of registration plates on a car 
is prima facie evidence that the owner of the vehicle has 
met the statutory financial requirements , but under the 
insure- the- driver plan it would be virtually impossible for 
a policeman , from nor~al observation, to determine whether 
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an operator was insured or otherwise financially responsible . 
From a legal point of view , a car- owner would be 
obliged to protect himself by buying an automobile owner ' s 
liability policy , since he could be held liable for the 
conduct of any driver to whom he entrusted the vehicle, 
insured or not . 
It likewise would impose on the ~ommissioner the 
frustrating task of developing " adequate, just reasonable 
and non- discriminatory" rates for the commercial car field, 
including trucks , taxicabs , public and private livery, and 
rented vehicles . As present , there are nearly a score of 
rates applicable to these vehicles , depending upon the 
nature of their operations . Policing the activities of thse 
drivers and requiring them to confine their driving within 
the class for which they were insured would be clearly 
beyond hope of attainment . 
A completely unworkable proposal is that which 
would include $50 or $100 deductible provisions in Massachu-
setts compulsory policies . It sponsors claim it would reduce 
rates substantially on the theory that if a motorist knew 
he would have to pay the first $50 or $100 of any accident 
claim he might cause , he would drive more carefully . 
Secondly , it is contended that the total daductible amounts 
collected from all motorists responsible for accidents would 
reduce commensurately the total claim losses of the companies 
and thus reduce insurance rates . 
This result probably could be reached within close 
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proximity were it not for two instinctive traits of human 
nature. One is that mighty few motorists will ever admit 
that they were responsible for an accident, even though they 
are insured and stand to lose no money through such an · 
admission. The second is that most people in this frame of 
mind would never stand for parting with $50 or $100 of their 
own money, as they would be required to do under the 
deductible plan. 
A $50 or $100 deductible clasue is included in 
standard collision or upset policies. This protects a 
motorist who may damage his car by upset or by collision 
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with another object, such as a tree, with no other car .involved. 
The insurance company will pay the motorist for the damage, 
minus the amount deductible, and the contract has been 
fullfilled. It is stricltly an indemnity agreement between 
the company and the motorist . 
Compulsory insurance is a totally different , prop-
sition. This embodies a third party liability insurance 
contract affecting not only the company and the motorist 
it insures, but the claimant as well . 
It would be the claimant who undeniably would 
suffer from the practical effects of a deductible plan. 
Thousands of accident victims with legitimate claims would 
be obliged to wait indefinitely for payment, simply because 
thousands of motorists reponsible for accident would refuse 
to pay the amounts deductible. 
Some deductible proposals would permit the companies 
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to pay the full claim and then proceed to collect the deduct-
ible from their policy holders, This would create an intoler-
ably bad relationship between companies and their policyholders 
because presumably a compny would be obliged to cancel a 
motorist's insurance for non-payment of the amount deductible. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE ASSIGNED RISK PLAN 
Massachusetts deals more leniently with motorists 
who are chronic bad risks than any other state in the 
nation . 
" If the insurance companies ruled theee bad risks 
off the road by denying them compulsory coverage, the rates 
would go down overnight . " 
This is a statement often made in any discussion of 
the cost of compulsory insurance . Regrettably , it is based 
on one more misconception about the system ' s operation . In 
Massachusetts , the companies cannot deny compulsory insurance 
to any motorist whose right to operate a -car has not been 
suspended or revoked by the Registry of Motor Vehicles.* 
When the compulsory law was enacted, the Legislature 
created the State Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability 
Policies and Bonds , This board of three members, represent-
ing the Insurance Commissioner , the Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles and the Attorney- General , was set up to review the 
appeals of car- owners who either have been refused insurance 
by a company or whose coverage has been cancelled. 
Assume , for example, that a company cancels the 
compulsory insurance of a car-owner for a series of severe 
costly accidents . The motorist will take his case to the 
Appeal Board and upon review the Board may conclude that the 
car- pwner is a genuine menace to public safety, and uphold 
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The company ' s cancellation. 
All this motorist has to do is go to any other 
insurance company and fill out what is known as a "truthful 
application ," listing in detail his accident experience 
with the company which canceled him. The second company may 
refuse to issue a policy. 
The motorist ' s next step is to return to the 
Appeal Board and contest the refusal . If it is found that 
64 
the aggrieved car- owner made no misstatement in his "truthful 
application ," the Board will order the second company to ±ssue 
insurance on the ground that it ha s had -no experience with him. 
This is why any car- owner whose license or regis-
tration has not been revoked by the Registry, can get 
insurance and put his car on the road , regardless of past 
performance on the highways and his potential for staging 
a repeat performance in the future . 
Motorists regarded by underwriters as substandard 
or borderline risks usually are issued insurance through 
the Assigned Risk Plan, an organization composed of all 
companies writing compulsory insurance in Massachusetts . 
The plan was adopted voluntarily by the companies 
in 1939 because it was recognized that there were risks 
whose previous records were so poor and whose potential 
record so forbidding that no company would be desirous of 
insuring them voluntarily . The purpose of the Plan , there-
fore , was twofold : 
1 . To make insurance available to motorists 
who in good faith were entitled to coverage 
but were unable to obtain it through ordinary 
channels . 
2 . To provide for the fair and equitable 
apportionment of these risks among all 
companies engaged in the compulsory business. 
Generally speaking, the quota of risks 
assigned to a company is based on its 
volume of compulsory business . * 
The Massachusetts Assigned Risk Plan was the first 
to be established in the country on a voluntary basis. 
Although it officially came into being on November 15, 1939, 
its desirability as a means of facilitating the handling of 
the business and providing better public services manifested 
itself a year earlier . In December of 1938 two companies 
specializing exclusively in automobile insurance went bank-
rupt, and the established companies in a single day worked 
out an emergency plan to provide coverage for the thousands 
of car-owners left high and dry by the defunct concerns. 
Originally, applicants for insurance were sent 
from the Plan to company receiving the assignment for final 
processing. The necessity was eliminated in 1950 when the 
Plan began to certify the applicant ' s registration blank 
simultaneously with the assignment, thereby enabling the 
applicant to go directly to the Registry to obtain his 
registration plates . Today, a substantial volume of the 
Plan ' s business is done by mail. 
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The motoring public generally is unaware of the 
emergency measures the companies have been obliged to take 
when a "tight" market in compulsory insurance, brought about 
by inadequate rates, could have resulted in thousands of 
motorists finding themselves unable to put their cars on the 
road by the first of the year . 
During these periods, some companies actually 
withdrew from the automobile business in Massachusetts, while 
others refused to accep~ new business, or both. On each 
occasion, however, the companies have agreed to renew all 
existing business on their books and to provide coverage for 
all qualified motorists . 
The Assigned Risk Plan long since has amended its 
rules to encourage companies to renew existing business in 
any year and also to solicit new business . 
Under Massachusetts law, any company may be reliev-
ed of renewing a motorist ' s insurance for the ensuing year, 
provided it issues a notice of its intention not to renew 
by November 15th . To discourage this practice, any company 
issuing a notice of intent not to renew receives in return 
an assignment of a similar notice from another company, 
plus a 10 percent penalty . For every 10 risks to whom a 
company issues notices of intent not to renew, it receives 
back ll assigned risks, and these are in addition to the 
number of assignments that would otherwise be apportioned 
to the company . 
To induce companies to accept new business, or a 
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risk who was not insured the previous year, any company 
accepting a new business risk directly receives a credit in 
lieu of an assignment otherwise attributable to it . This 
arrangement has worked most effectively , since in 1956 
about 60 , 000 " credit '' risks were written voluntarily . 
The Plan , whose status was changed from voluntary 
to statutory with the enactment of the Highway Safety Act 
of 1953 , has recently been handling an average 50,000 
assigned risks annually . Originally only compulsory insur-
ance was issued , but today any eligible bodily injury 
protection, plus property damage , and , if the applicant 
needs it to satisfy federal, state or municipal require-
ments , increased limits coverage . 
There is a considerable body of opinion in 
Massachusetts that motorists in the Assigned Risk Plan 
should be surcharged for their compulsory insurance because 
of their poor accident claim experience . In 1956, for 
instance , the claim frequency for cars in the Plan was 22 
claims per 100 cars insured , while the total loss ratio for 
the year was close to $1 . 69 in claims for every dollar 
received in premiums . This means that the companies not 
only lost 69 cents on the premium dollar for claims, but also 
that there was not a penny provided for wages, taxes or 
other business expenses . 
Every other state in the country imposes surcharges 
on assigned risks . A few states surcharge such risks, even 
if they have had no accident record . A 15 percent surcharge 
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is levied by all other states if there is a record of a 
single accident or minor conviction, and the surcharge runs 
as high as 35 percent if there is a record of multiple 
accidents or serious convictions . The period of assignment 
is three years in all other states except North Carolina, 
which keeps a risk assigned for two years. Under the 
Massachusetts Assigned Risk Plan , insurance is assigned for 
only one year and then is absorbed by the companies. 
While there may be justification for surcharging 
Massachusetts assigned risks in view of their bad claim loss 
experience, it is unlikely that the Commissioner would do 
so because it would set off a political uprising. If the 
Legislature rose to repeal the demerit rating system almost 
overnight because only a small group of motorists was sur-
charged, it would be expected to act in the same fashion 
if there were even a disposition to require the 50,000 car-
owners in the Assigned Risk Plan to pay their fair share of 
the total insurance cost . 
CHAPTER IX 
HOW COMPULSORY RATES ARE MADE 
To the layman , automobile insurance rate- making 
seems to be a mysterious and comples subject, understandable 
only by the actuaries who usually make the rates and develop 
rate- making procedures . 
This is true , in a sense , because the actual 
statistical and mathematical processes used in rate- making 
are rather detailed and generally require the services of an 
actuary , who is a statistician experienced or proficient in 
the analyses and interpretation of insurance statistical data . 
However , the essential mechanics of automobile 
liability insurance rate- making have become largely standard-
ized and can be reduced to a few relatively simple steps 
which the ordinary policyholder should be able to understand . 
It should first be noted that the insurance business 
is unique in that the cost of its product cannot be determined 
before the product is sold . In a business which sells 
commodities such as refrigerators , for example , the cost of 
the raw materials used in manufacturing the product, the 
wage cost of the manufacturing and similar items can be 
fairly accurately determined in advance by cost accounting 
methods . 
However , the raw materials of the automobile insur-
ance product are the amount of accident claims which will be 
paid under the policy at some future date and will not be 
definitely determined until after the policy has terminated . 
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Insurance rates must , therefore, be based to a 
large degree on the assumption that the experience in the 
past, properly analyzed , and projected in accordance with 
trends, is the best guide to probable conditions in the 
future . Consequently , consideration of past loss experience 
is axiomatic in insurance rate- making . Because of this, the 
detailed statistical reporting procedures outlined in the 
previous chapter are set up to accumulate continually 
statistical data on past loss experience that can be used to 
make future rates, to establish trends, and to provide a 
basis for research . 
The compulsory rate consists of two portions: 
1 . The loss portion , referred to as the pure 
premium, representing the amount in the 
rates needed from each car- owner to PV the 
claim losses caused by drivers of insured 
automobiles . 
2 . The expense portion , representing the 
amount in the rates allowed the companies 
by the Commissioner for the cost of carrying 
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on the business . This allowance is established 
in accordance with the requirements of the 
stock agency companies, which write the 
coverage through agents and brokers who 
provide essential services for their clients . 
No unfairness to the public is involved in 
setting the same expense allowance for both 
stock and mutual companies because the 
mutual companies , when a profit is earned 
on compulsory insurance , pay dividends to 
their policyholders, and also because any 
car- owner eligible for coverage outside the 
Assigned Risk Plan is free to choose the 
type of insurance company he desires . * 
Rates are also developed separately for different 
types of vehicles , such as private passenger cars, commercial 
cars , taxis , buses , etc ., but the rate- making procedures for 
each are essentially the same . 
The first step in developing compulsory rates is 
to establish a statewide average claim cost per car insured. 
This is done by estimating the average amount that should be 
collected from each car- owner to cover the contemplated 
losses for the calendar year for which the rates are being 
make . 
At this point , a system of community merit rating 
is applied , in that each city and town is placed in a 
specific rating territory in accordance with the collective 
accident claim loss experience of its own motorists . 
This rating procedure is further refined to bring 
about a more equitable distribution of insurance costs by 
the Commissioner ' s formula of assessing premium surcharges 
on cars with the drivers under 25 years of age and on cars 
used principally for business . 
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The surcharging system , of course, is based on the 
far more destructive and costly accident loss experience of 
these groups of motorists , and its application makes substan-
tially lower rates possible for the owners of cars driven 
exclusively by older persons , who r epresent the vast majority 
of all car- owners . 
Once all communities have been assigned to higher 
or lower rating territories as described above and all car--
owners have been placed in their respective classifications 
as to the age of drivers and busine s s use , it is possible to 
determine on a territorial basis the average amounts needed 
from each motorist in each classification to cover the cost 
of anticipated claims . 
The final step is to add to these average amounts 
whatever portion of the premium dollar the Commissioner 
may allow for company expenses . Now , the total compulsory 
rates for each class of car- owner by territories have been 
established . 
Throughout the whole procedure just described, the 
Commissioner not only fixes and establishes the compulsory 
rates , but also determines how communities are to be grouped 
into rating territories and by classifications of car-owners . 
Under the Massachusetts Compulsory Automobile 
Liability Insurance Act , the Commissioner is required to 
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"fix and establish fair and reasonable classifications of 
risks , and adequate, just and reasonable and non- discriminatory 
premium charges ." 
In layman ' s language , this means that the Commiss-~ 
ioner has an obligation to protect both the public interest 
and the solvency of the insurance companies . The rates must 
be 'reasonable" , that is , not so high that the insurance 
companies will make an unreasonable profit ; but they also 
must be "adequate", that is , not so low that the companies 
will incur a financial loss on their compulsory automobile 
business . 
73 
It is to be noted that there is no allowance for 
profit in the Massachusetts compulsory rates , as Commissioner 
Humphreys testified before the special investigating Commission 
on July 23 , 1957 . 
According to standard rate- making practice, accepted 
in principle in all other jurisdictions as well as by all 
Commissioners in Massachusetts , the rate- making process 
involves a scientific prediction geared to the objective that 
if the rates are exactly right during the period in which 
they apply , the claim losses actually incurr ed by the companies 
will exactly equal the amount provided in the rates for the 
companies to pay these losses , and enough money will be left 
over to meet the reasonable expense requirements of the 
companies . 
Yet , the rates established by Massachusetts 
Commissioners have failed to meet this requirement in all 
but one (1954 ) of the most recent six years . The Commissioner ' s 
provision in the rates to pay accident claim losses on 
private passenger cars fell short of the losses actually 
incurred by the companies by the f ollowing amounts : 1951-
$6 , 000 , 000 ; 1952- $4 , 700 , 000 ; 1953- $700 , 000 ; 1954- +$600 , 000 ; 
1955- $5 , 300 , 000 ; 1956- $8 , 200 , 000 . * 
This shows a total deficiency of $24 , 300 . 00 for 
a six- year period , tells the story of why the companies had 
no alternative but to appeal to the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court against the inadequacy of the rates set by 
the Commissioner for 1957 . 
The companies won the case when the Court found 
that the Commissioner , in granting no increase for 1957 , 
ignored evidence that the companies had sustained such tremen-
dous losses in 1955 and 1956. 
The Court annulled the 1957 rates and directed 
the Commissioner to set "new and ade quate" rates based on 
testimony presented to him at a public hearing conducted 
the previous autumn . The companies had recommended an 
average state- wide increase of 22 percent for private passen-
ger cars for 1957 , but the Commissioner finally raised theee 
rates an average of 19 . 6 percent . 
The amount provided in the Commissioner ' s rates to 
pay accident claims and the amount theoretically assigned to 
meet company expenses has a vital bearing on this whole 
underwriting picture , and frequently has been a matter of 
contention between the Commissioner and the companies . 
In setting the compulsory rates for private passen-
ger cars , the Commissioner makes an allowance in the rates to 
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pay claims and an allowance for company expenses. 
It is relatively simple to explain how the 
expenses allowance in the rates is consumed . All expense 
data goes directly from the companies to the Commissioner 
and are analyzed by his actuarial staff under the following 
classifications : 
1 . Investigation and Adjustment of Claims: 
This consists of salaries and expenses of 
claim adjusters , court fees , lawyers ' fees, 
medical reports , etc . 
2 . Commission Expenses : This consists of the 
Commissions to agents and brokers for handling 
the business . 
3 . Other Acquisition Costs : This consists of 
the other expenses of acquiring business, 
such as advertising , licenses, policywriting, 
billing , etc . 
4. Taxes , License and Fees : These are the 
expenses incurred in the form of state 
premium taxes , licenses , and other fees to 
do business , along with miscellaneous federal 
taxes . 
5. General Administration Expenses : These 
include the expenses of collecting under-
writing or rating information , inspection 
reports , accident prevention, rating bureau 
assessments , statistical and other overhead 
costs such as wages to employees , rents, 
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light, heat, telephone, office equipment, 
supplies and printing . 
As an elementary problem in mathematics, there would 
have been rate reductions in Massachusetts instead of rate 
increases in recent years if the loss ratio on the compulsory 
premium dollar had remained within the Commissioner's 
allowance in the rates to pay claims . But rising claim 
frequencies and a relentless advance in the cost of settling 
claims year after year have invariably created loss ratios 
far in excess of the Commissioner ' s allowance in the rates to 
pay claims. When this occurs, the loss ratio in excess of 
the Commissioner ' s allowance naturally results in huge losses 
by the companies . 
Thd.s situation is explained most graphically in 
the table found on page 7g, listing the accident loss 
experience for private passenger cars in Massachusetts over 
the years . 
The salient points illustrated in the table are: 
1 . That the average cost of claims has risen 
about 6 percent annually since the Korean 
War, due to inflationary forces in the 
economy . 
2. That claim frequency, while showing a 
tendency to fluctuate, rose sharply in 1955 
and shot even more sharply in 1956. 
3 . That in all but one (1954) of the six years 
the percentage of premium actually required 
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to pay claim losses exceeded the percentage 
allowed in the Commissioner's rates to pay 
such losses.* 
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ACCIDENT LOSS EXPERIENCE FOR PRIVATE PASSENGER CARS IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Policy Claim Losses 
year Incurred 
1956 $45 , 600,053 
1955 37 , 988 , 644 
1954 31 , 298 , 309 
1953 28,366 , 3 03 
1952 27 , 483 , 765 
1951 26,278,849 
No . of 
Claims 
87 , 186 
77 , 122 
68 , 190 
66 , 195 
67 , 679 
67,203 
Claim Ave . 
Freq . ':' Claim 
Cost 
6 . 8 $523 
6 . 3 493 
6 . 0 459 
6. 1 429 
6 . 4 406 
6 . 6 391 
% of Premium 
Actually required 
to Pay Losses 
83 .o 
76 . 0 
63 . 1 
65 . 0 
77 . 2 
82 . 8 
% of Premium 
Set by State 
to Pay Losses 
67 . 5 
65 . 5 
63 . 5 
63 . 5 
63 . 5 
63.5 
* Claim frequency per 100 cars insured. (The above fiqures are current-1957-and may 
vary slightly as final disposition of remaining claims is made . 




THE "RATING BUREAU" CONTROVERSY 
Any attempt to explain in detail how Massachusetts 
compulsory insurance rates are calculated must, for purposes 
of clarity, be preceded by an explanation of the functions 
and duties of the existing rating organization maintained by 
the companies . 
This prior explanation of the rating organization's 
role in the rate- making process is necessary because of 
constant political demands for the creation of what is 
erronePUsly referred to as a "state rating bureau . " These 
demands are usually accompanied by irlimations or outright 
accusations that the present organization deliberately 
juggles and pads its accident loss stat ist ics to gain t i gher 
compulsory rates from the Insurance Commissioner . 
The sincerity behind this move has always been open 
to question because the Insurance Department for years has 
had a state rating bureau, designated as the "Rating Section" 
of the Department . How else could the Commissioner have set 
compulsory rates annually for 30 years , if he did not have 
his own rating bureau and his own actuaries to advise him? 
In addition , the Commissioner is required by law to approve 
workmen ' s compensation rates and to regulate all other rates . 
It is obvious that he could not carry out these statutory 
requirements without the assistance of his own rating section 
and actuaries . 
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Since 1926 the insurance companies have maintained 
a rating organization to collect and analyze the compulsory 
insurance statistics of each company . It is called the 
Massachusetts Automobile Rating and Accident Prevention 
Bureau . While this organization serves as the statistics 
gathering agent of the Commissioner for compulsory insurance, 
its functions are not limited to this field . It serves under 
law as the statistics gathering agent for other forms of 
automobile bodily injury coverage , and its office facilities 
are also used for the compilation of statistics of workmen's 
compensation insurance . 
The expense of gathering and processing statistics 
on each of these forms of insurance is naturally segregated, 
and each is assessed accordingly . Through this method, it 
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is impossible to load the expenses of keeping statistics on 
other forms of insurance on the cost of compulsory automobile 
insurance . As a result , this cost element of the Massachusetts 
compulsory system is kept to a minimum . 
The formation of this rating organization was 
clearly described by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court in 1937 in its decision in the case of American 
Employers ' Insurance Compny v . Commissioner of Insurance 
(298 Mass . 161) : 
"When the Compulsory motor vehicle insurance law 
was first enacted in 1925 , the Commissioner of 
Insurance then in office considered various possible 
methods for determining premium charges. 
There was formed with his approval a voluntary 
association of the interested insurance corporations , 
termed for convenience the bureau. 
objects were to cooperate with the 
carrying out the provisions of the 
insurance law and to deal with the 





It was, however, fDrmed at his request and was 
adopted by him as his principal instrumentality for 
collecting data and statistics for use in establish-
ing classifications of risks and fixing premium 
charges as required by said section 113B. 
Its use for this purpose has been continued by all 
subsequent Commissioners, including the respondent. 
Each Commissioner, including the respondent, has 
established rules and regulations in great detail, 
known as the statistical plan, to be used by the 
insurance companies for reporting to the bureau 
the dats, statistics, and information required 
for the fixing of classifications and premium 
charges ."* 
Because of the limited experience of any one 
company, all companies writing compulsory insurance have to 
have a central statistics gathering agency to collect the 
combined experience of the whole induBtry so that rates can 
be calculated with most reliable factual information 
obtainable . 
Under the Massachusetts law, however, this agency 
can only recommend to the Commissioner what the companies 
believe the compulsory rates should be . 
A function of the 6ompanies ' rating organization 
is to maintain a statistical department where IBM machines 
for classification of facts and figures. 
The operation is so completely mechanical that 
whether it is performed by the present agency or by the state 
the statistics will come out the same. 
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The existing organization was formed by the com-
panies in 1926 at the request of the then Insurance Commiss-
ioner Monk . He knew there would have to be a central clearing 
house for the loss statistics of all companies and he 
significantly refrained from setting up a new state agency 
to do the job . 
The present agency operates under the rules and 
regulations set by the Commissioner . It never holds a 
meeting on compulsory automobile insurance rates without 
inviting the Commissioner or his representative to be present, 
and as a result the Insurance Department is represented at 
practically every meeting . 
Two vitally essential factors in rate-making are 
paid and outstanding claims , plus company expenses for 
earring on the business of compulsory insurance. In accord-
ance with the Commissioner ' s orders , no data on company 
expenses is handled by the agency at all but goes directly 
from the companies to the Insurance Department . The data 
on company expenses is always broken down in itemized form 
in compliance with the Commissioner ' s instructions. 
It is a relatively simple function for the Insurance 
Department to analyze and process company expenses, but it 
would be an overwhelming task for the department to process 
and classify the tremendous volume of accident claim statistics 
and the millions of motor vehicles insured . In fact, it was 
upon this foregone conclusion that Commissioner Monk requested 
the companies to establish the present rating organization in 
1926 . 
In the final analys is, the Commissioner, with the 
assistance of his own rating staff , determines the compulsory 
rates from the statistical evidence on claim statistics 
compiled by the existing rating organization but constantly 
checked by state examiners, plus the statistics on company 
expenses compiled by his own department . 
The services performed by the statistical depart-
ment of the companies rating organization represent a sub-
stantial financial sa~ing to the Commonwealth . As previously 
noted, in addition to processing statistics on compulsory 
insurance , the division also compiles figures on other forms 
of bodily injury coverage and on the vast field of workmen~s 
compensation . 
The insurance companies are sufficiently practical 
to realize that their own rating organization ' s statistics 
must be scrupulously accurate because there would be a public 
scandal if the state examiners were to find anything out of 
line . 
Insurance Commissioner Joseph A. Humpreys, appearing 
before a special investigation commission at the State House 
recently as July 23 , 1957 , testified that the results of 
constant checking by his examiners had convinced him that the 
present rating organization ' s statistics were completely 
accurate . He further said that he had experienced no difficulty 
at any time in obtaining any type of statistical data from 




As private passenger cars comprise about $7 percent 
of all registered motor vehicles in Massachusetts, it quite 
naturally follows that nearly all of the contention over 
insurance costs has been focused on the compulsory rates 
set by the Commission on this type of vehicle . 
"Auto Rate Hike Brings Roar of Protest" has now 
become a familiar newspaper headline in Massachusetts, and 
it is usually accompanied by a statement from the insurance 
companies, insisting that the rates are grossly inadequate . * 
It is common knowledge that motoring accidents 
have risen at an alarming rate since 1951, not only in 
Massachusetts but throughout the nation . At the same time, 
the cost of satisfying accident claims has gone up even to a 
greater extent , due to national inflation which has seriously 
driven up hospital and medical costs , wages to injured 
employees , and every other element that goes into a claim. 
In the final analysis, it should be plain that when 
the number of claims and the cost of claims increase consist-
ently and extensively over a period of years, automobile 
insurance rates cannot possibly go in any direction buy 
upwards . 
The combination of these two elements has created 
an intolerable state of affairs in Massachusetts for both 
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the motoring public and the insurance companies. 
On one hand, the public, often confused by political 
misstatments, is becoming exasperated at having to pay the 
dollar cost of its own motoring recklessness . On the other 
hand, the insurance companies are equally distrubed because 
they have been unable to get sufficient premiums under the 
Commissioner ' s rates to pay claims , plus reasonable costs 
of doing business . 
It is a matter of public record that while the 
insurance companies annually recommend to the Commissioner 
the compulsory rates which they believe should be established, 
the Commissioner consistently has set rates lower than those 
recommended by the companies . 
The following table , covering compulsory rates 
for private passenger cars , shows the average overall change 
in rates recommended by the companies and those finally set 
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Although the Commissioner slashed the rate recom-
mendations of the companies year after year, subsequent 
developments in the accident loss experience proved that the 
companies ' estimates and requests for rate increases decidedly 
were on the conservative side . 
Even if the companies had been graned the rate 
increases they recommended during the six- year period from 
1951 through 1956 , the actual claim losses still would have 
exceeded the provision for losses in the rates by more than 
$13 , 000 . 000 . 
It can be noted in the above table that the 
insurance companies in 1954 recommended a 3 percent reduction 
in compulsory rates for private passenger cars for the year 
1955 . At that time , the companies set forth that while 
~ere had been an encouraging reduction in the frequency of 
accident claims during the latter part of 1953 and early 
1954 , there had still been a steady rise in the average cost 
of claims . 
For this reason , the companies stated that any 
reduction of more than 3 percent would result in inadequate 
rates in the event of a sudden worsening of claim frequency . 
The eommissioner ordered a 6 . 3 percent reduction , which in 
turn was followed by an abrupt rise in claim frequency late 
in 1954. This trend continued upward through 1955 , 1956, and 
1957 . 
The most significant deve lopement of all, however, 
was the circumstance that compulsory rates were actually 
reduced in Massachusetts in 1955 in the midst of a period of 
steady , overall increases in claim costs . 
In the light of all evidence sence accumulated, it 
is not unreasonable to assume that the heartening improvement 
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in accident claim frequency noted in late 1953 and early 1954 
was due in large measure to the demerit rating system enacted 
as part of the Highway Safety Act of 1953 . 
Consideration of this measure by the legislature 
was attended by widespread publicity, particularly with 
respect to the number of demerit points which might be 
assessed against accident-prone and law- breaking motorists . 
This tremendous publicity undeniably had a salutary effect 
on Massachusetts motorists and proved beyond question that 
it is actually possible, through stern enforcement measures, 
~ reduce both human suffering and automobile insurance rates 
in any period of ascending accident trends. 
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Any further discussion of this incident in M4ssachu-
setts motoring would appear to be academic, however, because 
the Legislature repealed all provisions of the Highway Safety 
Act dealing with compulsory insurance early in 1956. 
Unquestionably, the principal force which motivated the 
Legislature was the outrage of only a small group, approxi-
~ately one percent of the 1, 500,000 car-owners, who suddenly 
discovered that they had to pay compulsory insurance surcharges 
for accident involvement or for violations of the highway laws 
and regulation~ 
These surcharges had been set a $6 per point by the 
Insurance Commissioner . Contrary to the favorite political 
misstatement of that period, these surcharges never did and 
were never intended to "enrich the bursting coffers of the 
insurance companies ." Under the now dead statute, the surcharges 
were applied by the Commissioner toward reducing compulsory 
rates for car- owners who had received no demerit points . 
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CHAPTER XII 
A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF A COMPANY PLAN 
The "No Accident Savings Plan" of National 
Casualty--symbolized "NA$P"--involves use of the Family* 
policy and a combination of individual merit and demerit 
rating. Unlike many other "economy" Automobile programs, 
underwriting is not intended to screen out all but so-called 
"good" business . One of the objectives of the program is to 
maintain a classification and rating plan whereby the company 
and its agents can serve all automobile owners and operators 
who are deserving of the privilege of driving upon the high-
ways of their community . As a consequence, this company's 
plan is designed to refine insureds into three groups , average 
better than average , and worse than average or marginal risks. 
To do this, the company bases its rating plan not only apon 
the individual attitudes , habits and personal characteristics 
of the insured . 
The plan calls for schedule rating, experience 
rating and the use of certain judgment factors . 
POLICY PROVISIONS 
Coverages are packaged . The Liability package 
includes Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability and 
Medical Payments . Coverage is available in the following 
limits : 
*For a samll percentage of insureds the basic (1955) policy 







The Physical Damage package includes Comprehensive, 
Collision, and Towing and Labor costs coverage. These are 
available in combinations,,as follows : ACV Comprehensive 
and $50 Deductible Collision : ACV Comprehensive and $100 
Deductible Collision: $50 Deductible Comprehensive and $50 
Deductible Collision, and $50 Deductible Comprehensive and 
$100 Deductible Collision. 
The Physical Damage packages or the Liability 
packages may be written alone or in combination with each 
other. 
ELIGIBLE AUTOMOBILES 
Only private passenger automobiles are eligible. 
These are defined as "motor vehicles designed for the 
transporatation of private passengers only . Such vehicles 
may be used for pleasure or business, excluding any trans-
portation for hire, or use in demonstration, racing, or the 
apprehension of law violators or prisoners. 
Vehicles of the following types are also classified 
as private passenger vehicles--provided the vehicle is not 
used for retail or wholesale delivery; sedan delivery; a 
private passenger body type altered internally for transport-
ing tools, and repairing maintenance supplies; and a jeep, 
station wagon or light delivery type vehicle having a load 
capacity of 1500 lbs . or less . Certain other vehicles used 
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for retail or wholesale delivery are also rated as private 
passenger automobiles . 
RATING 
The rate for each coverage in force is determined 
up to a point in accordance with standard National Bureau 
procedures . The basic classification schedule of the 
National Bureau-lA, lB, lC , etc .--is used to establish the 
general classification of the risk . Then, the manual shows 
for each of the geographical territories base rates for 
these general classes . For the optional packages, these 
base rates include the premium for the total standard 
protection in the package. 
The base rate is then converted in accordance with 
the company ' s own schedule or experience rate, whichever is 
applicable . It is in this area of schedule of experience 
rates , that the company's point system operates. 
MERIT PLAN 
The NA$P rating plan includes these primary techni-
ques : 
l . A schedule rate for the first po~y term. 
This rate is variable. It is adjusted by 
the agent and the company to a level equitable with the past 
driving history, attitudes, habits and experience of the risk . 
This schedule is designed to give all reasonable deserving 
applicants an opportunity to establish a first term insurance 
record . 
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2. An experience rate for each policy term 
after the first term. The experience rate is variable also. 
Howver, it is dependent soley upon whether accidents or 
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losses are, or arenot, reported on the policy. Note that 
arrests, violations, poor driving attitudes, etc., are not 
chargeable on renewal. Thus, once having an opportunity to 
establish an insurance record with the company, the policyholder 
thereafter pays premiums in accordance with his own record. 
3. Schedule rates and experience rates are 
percentage surcharges on or discounts from the base rate.(the 
base rate is determined as explained above.)* 
There is no application required at renewal. All 
of the information from which the schedule rate is derived is 
determined at the time of the first application. 
Standard policy terms are for one year. 
SCHEDULE RATING METHODS 
Determination of the schedule rate requires accurate 
information about the insured history of the applicant; the 
accident history, traffic enforcement record, driving skill, 
attitudes and habits of the operators and the extremes of use 
to which the vehicle is put . 
All information is subject to verification, at the 
option of the company, from such sources as it considers 
objective and disinterested . The company uses what i t considers 
best information, and its evaluation of information and i ts 
* 19 Page 93 . 
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application is final 
Initial information f or determination of the schedule 
rate is established by one of the following; an authenticated 
Automobile insurance history ; a warranty endorsement signed 
by the applicant; a schedule rating questionnaire . 
An authenticated insurance history means either a 
statement from the applicant ' s former insurer or a statement 
sets forth the periods during which policies were in force 
and the dates and number of all accidents or losses occuring 
under the policy. 
The warranty endorsement is signed by the applicant 
and contains his statements as to his accident , loss and 
traffic enforcement history . 
ELIGIBILITY 
An applicant is not eligible for the first two-
methods--history or warranty endorsement of schedule rating 
unless : 
1 . He has been the owner or principal operator 
of a private passenger automobile for the 
three years immediately prior to the policy 
term. 
2 . Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability 
insurance has been maintained continuously 
in force on the automobile during that 
period . 
3 . The owner and principal operator have not 
been arrested or convicted for traffic 
violation during such three years . 
4. Similar insurance has not been cancelled, 
rejected or refused to be renewed by another 
compamy for any operator of the vehicle 
during that period. 
If either of the first two methods are used , the 
schedule rate is determined by the number of accidents 
involving the automobile during the four year period immed-
iately prior to the schedule rated term. The base rate is 
increased or decreased as follows : 
Accident History 
Period 
4 prior years 



















1 . 5 
2 . 0 
3. 0 
4. 0 
For any new risk, the questionnaire method may be 
used to develop information indicative of the accident and/or 
loss potential of the automobile to be insured. The infor-
mation required is in two general categories : accident 
potential f actors and history factors . 
Each factor is assigned a point value . The points 
are totaled separately under each of the two general categor-
ies accident potential and history- -and the point total is 
then converted to a percentage of the classification , base 
rate . 
~'19 Page 95 . 
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In certain situations--e . g ., when the schedule rate 
premium is above the b.ase rate--the signature of the applicant 
is required on the questionnaire . The signature is not always 
required, however . 
The schedule by which points are converted to 
percentages of the base rate is as follows : 
Points Percent of Base Rate Multiply Base Rate By* 
0- 3Q Base rate 1 . 0 
31- 50 125% 1 . 25 
51- 50 150% 1 . 5 
101- 175 200% 2 . 0 
176- 250 250% 2. 5 
251- 3 50 300% 3 . 0 
3 51 and higher 400% 4 . 0 
ACCIDENT POTENTIAL CATEGORY 
Here is the schedule which is followed to assign 
points based upon the accident potential of the risk : 
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a . Inexperienced Operation : Vehicle operated 
by any male person under 21 years of age 
with less than the indicated experience 
0- l years 
l - 2 years 
2- 3 years 
as owner and principal operator of a 





b . Driver Condition: Vehicle operated by 
driver influenced by •• alcohol , medication 
inducing drowsiness , stimulants , fatique--
long hours work, driving narcotics, insu-
fficient time for distances • • •• • ••••• • • l20 
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c . Personal Responsibility : Operation by 
irresponsible person , such as disrespectful 
of law and authority ; engaged in illegal 
activities ; testimony would be doubted; 
don ' t comprehend signs, rules; normally 
aggressive, discourteous, belligerent toward 
others ••••••••••••••• • •• 80 
d . Reckless Operation : Reckless or daring 
operation such as fast on starts, stops, 
curves ; jumping lights and traffic ; passing 
on hills , curves , in intersections, in 
heavy traffic ; forcing way in and around 
traffic, lane hopping, bumper crowding; 
usually at or above speed limits, racing, 
showing off •••••••••••••• 120 
e . Careless Operation : Vehicle driven care-
lessly, such as traffic signs not observed, 
failure to signal stops, turns ; turns from 
wrong lanes etc., backing, starting, without 
looking •••••••••••••••• 80 
f . Vehicle Condition : Neglected or unsafe 
condition, such as glass broken , cracked , 
clouded bumpers , fenders dented ; head, tail , 
stop , turn lites damaged ; tires worn, 
unsafe •••••••••• • • • • • •• 60 
g . Driver Impairment : Vehicle operated by 
driver having impaired vision , hearing , 
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limbs , mind ••••••• •••• ••• • 80 
Over age 65- for each year over ••• •• 20 
h . Military : 
{1) married and living on post with 
family •••• • • •• ••• •• • 80 
(2) all others •••• • •• •• • • • 300 
Points are charged based upon the ''driving history" 
of the risk as follows: 
a . Accident and Loss History 
(1) losses in last 12 months occuring while 
auto was parked or unattended . each 30 
{2) all other accidents in last three 
years . • • • • • • • • • • • each 60 
b. Traffic and Law Enforcement History of 
Every Driver ••• for every arrest for a 
traffic violation or any other crime {not 
parking ticket s) in last three years . each 40 
c . Insurance History ••• If, within the immed-
iately prior three year period, similar 
insurance has been cancelled, rejected, 
or renewal refused by another company or 
companies , for or because of any driver of 
the vehicle ••••••• • •• • •• •• 60* 
POINTS THEN ADDED 
The points derived under the accident potential 
category are then computed as are the points under the "driving 
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history" category and only the higher sectional points are 
used with the conversion table to determine the factor by 
which the base rate is increased or multiplied. The sectional 
points are not added together . 
EXPERIENCE RATING 
Experience rating applies to the second and all 
continuously succeeding policy terms . In other words , 
following the first year , the schedule rating point system 
is not used . Instead , accidents or losses involving an 
insured vehicle--except an occurrence reported under the 
policy solely for reimbursement purposes under the Towing 
and Road Service provisions--are used to compute discounts 
or surcharges . 
Experience rates are multiples of the base rate as 
follows : 
CHARGEABLE ACCIDENT NO ACCIDENT 
Renewal TABLE SAVING TABLE 
Premium Number of Accident in Number of consecutive 
Factoring current and sonsecutively Accident- free policy 
Tables prior policy terms terms . 
5 4 3 2 l l 2 3 4 
Factor : 
Multiply 4. 0 3 . 0 2. 0 1. 5 1. 0 . 90 . 80 . 75 . 70 
Base Rate by 
The number of accidents chargeable on renewal 
includes all accidents occuring under the policy since the 
latest accident- free term. 
Each year the risk is loss free, he steps down one 
premium level on renewal. For example, if the insured pays 
400% of the base rate during the initial policy term, and is 
accident-free during that year, he pays 300% of the base 
rate upon renewal. There is one important exception to this, 
however. Following three accident-free policy terms, the 
rate drops to 75% of the base rate {70% of the base rate if 
the insured began by paying 90% or less of the base rate.) 
In other words, if the insured starts even at 400% of the 
base rate, after three accident-free years, he drops all the 
way down to 75% of the base rate. 
REHABILITATION OR RATE MODIFICATION ENDORSEMENTS 
There are sey~ral endorsements for use with the 
program which are intended to modify the base rate by 
eliminating certain drivers or encourage better driving by 
setting forth specific conditions of use and operation of 
the automobile. These endorsements do not void coverage. 
Instead, they give the company rights to reclassify rates 
or to cancel, and to that extend only penalize a policyholder. 
For example, one endorsement restricts use of the 
automobile so that it will not be used for such things as 
racing purposes, school transportation, night driving by 
members of the armed forces on leave, etc. 
HANDLING PROCEDURE 
Cash is required with the application--either the 
entire premium or the first installment of a 40-30-30 plan. 
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The producer sends a form to a credit reporting concern at 
the same time as he sends the application to the home office 
or local managing general agency . 
Every point of the application is checked and if 
fue agent has missed any feature of accident history or 
personal characteristics for which a charge should have been 
made, he gets instructions to pick up the extra premium imme-
diately . The insured can pay it or cancel at this point . If 
he decides to cancel, the cancellation is short rate, based 
upon the premium which had been charged in the first place . 
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CHAPTER XIII 
SAFE DRIVER PLANS CONDITIONING INSURANCE INDUSTRY FOR 
COMPULSORY INSURANCE 
In the automobile underwriting field in 1959 there 
were fifty- odd safe driver plans which , as and of themselves , 
served only to compound the difficulties of underwriters--
not to mention what is likely to happen as the result of 
superimposing on these safe driver plans a gist of so- called 
economy policies designed primarily to create competition 
among the independents . 
It is cause for conjecture whether executives in 
the fire and casualty business who have plunged into such 
plans without any previous experience or ideas as to what 
problems they may be building up for themselves and their 
companies . The situation is similar to conditions in the 
early part of 1952 when safe driver plans were cited as the 
one and only way to ward off compuls ory insurance-- especially 
in the State of New York . Regarding this aspect attention 
should be called to the fact that the casualty industry was 
greatly relieved when in his 1952 message to the New York 
Legislature , Governor Dewey remained quiet on the question 
of compulsory automobile liability insurance. To many 
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insurance executives at that time , this omission was very important 
"for the preservation of underwriting or selection in what 
had then become the most troublesome sphere of underwriting 
in the entire casualty field ."* Particularly since it had 
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understood that the Governor would make an anno~ement in 
favor of compulsory insurance and thereby fall in line with 
editorial policy of the " New York Times ." The New York 
Times had not only predicted that Governor Dewey would 
support compulsory insurance , but stated editorially that 
"if compulsory automobile insurance is a good idea-and we 
believe it is- then we see no reason why the matter cannot 
be acted upon at this legislative session . " 
It was something of a victory for the opponents 
of compulsory insurance that the Governor did not recommend 
it in his annual message , but he did request, among other 
things , that serious consideration be given to the problem 
of reducing the premium rates of so- called "safe driver ." 
This request renewed the Safe Driver Reward Plan which had 
set company against company- and agent against agent as well 
as against companies- but more important, it provoked the 
question whether this wasn ' t an adroit method, at this 
particular time , of preparing the way for compulsory insurance 
withou the political risk involved in the outright champion-
ship of the cause . 
On February 2 , 1952 , Mr . Roger Kenney, Insurance 
Editor of the United States Investor wrote : 
The situation is as easy as this to under-
stand . Here in Massachusetts where we have 
had the questionable distiction since 1927 
of living under the only compulsory law 
in the country , the greatest bone of conten-
tion since the enactment of the legislation 
has been the matter of rates . We don ' t have 
to remind our readers that only a year ago 
the insurance industry had to fight a very 
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expensive battle against a referendum designed 
to eliminate the zone system and replace it with 
a flat rate applicable throughout the state . 
And that referendum was decisively beaten at the 
polls by more than three to one- thanks to a 
very intelligent and resourseful leadership 
within the industry- stock and mutual alike . 
But now comes the news from Beacon Hill 
that the Legislative Committee on Insurance 
in Massachusetts , with five Republican members 
dissenting, has once again reported favorably 
on a bill calling for a flat rate . Which, of 
itself , isn ' t surprising because that has been 
the accepted procedure in the past--the Commit-
tee apparently acting on the theory that the 
full responsibility for voting down the flat 
rate proposal should rest with the entire 
legislature . What is surprising and revealing , 
however , is the fact that during the discussions 
before the Committee , the arch foe of the present 
zone system and sponsor of last year ' s unsuccess-
ful flat rate referendum let it be known that 
he regarded the merit rating 1plan (of which some 27 were before the Committee as the "perfect 
plan" since "bad drivers would pay more than 
the good drivers and all drivers would be 
made safety conscious ." Even more significant 
was his comment to the effect that he would go 
along with a merit rating plan based upon the 
zone system since "it would never go through 
the legislature otherwise ." 
There you have it ! In effect , what has 
happened now in Massachusetts is that a promise--
for what it is worth--has been made by the 
severest critics of compulsory insurance that 
their resistance will cease if only an accept-
able merit rating plan- based upon the individual 
driver ' s record- is adopted to replace the present 
system wherein the rates are predicated upon the 
number and severity of accidents involving cars, 
garaged in the respective zones . 
You will ask : "What has all this to do 
\'lith the recent events in New York? " The 
answer is that once the casualty industry 
succumbs to the pleadings for an industry- wide 
merit rating system based on individual accident 
records- a plan that has been tried in the past 
with unfortunate results for most companies- it 
is setting the stage for immediate adoption of 
compulsory insurance . For , you don ' t have to be 
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much of a political observer to realize that 
once you remove the primary objection to compul-
sory insurance- the fact that unless penalties 
are set up, such insurance is all to apt to be 
used by irresponsible and reckless drivers a 
license to maim and kill-the road toward 
adoption is that much easier to negotiate 
politically . 
How accurate this prediction proved to be is now 
a matter of history . It was not long after the Governor's 
message that the pressure from Superintendent Bohlinger upon 
the companies became so insistent that the National Bureau 
and the MUtual Casualty Rating Bureau found it advisable to 
sit down together and work out a safe driver plan for New 
York State . The bureau ' s had little choice in the matter 
with Superintendent Bohlinger pressing on the point that 
"the insurance business should be responsive to the wants 
of its customers"--that "management must be watchful to guard 
against a tendency to believe that the present form of doing 
business is fixed, inimitable and perfect"--that "any service 
industry which fails to be constantly perceptive to the wants 
of its customers cannot hope to retain public support"--
and last , that "casualty company executives have a moral 
responsibility to provide coverage inasmuch as they vigor-
ously supported legislation which has impelled approximately 
90 per cent of New York State motorists in insure their 
cars ."'::: 
Such were the Superintendent ' s remarks- all emphasiz-
ing that individual rating on an accident basis is a necessary 
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concomitant of a compulsory law- whether it be of the financial 
responsibility type or the outright compulsory type . This 
is what has been the root of all the squabbling on rate--
making through the years in Massachusetts . It comes down to 
the fact that in the minds of many people this matter of 
compulsion to purchase automobile insurance should be 
counterbalanced with an opportunity to purchase the coverage 
at the lowest possible price depending upon the accident 
record of the individual driver or owner of a car . 
Here we see why the Safe Driver plan prepared the 
way for adoption of compulsory insurance in New York State 
rather then serving to stem the tide of popular and news-
paper demand for such legislation . Just three years after 
Governor Dewey gave the compulsory automobile liability 
question the silent treatment , New York had a compulsory law. 
The question now is whether , with insurance compan-
ies having gone on a veritable spree of safe driver plans on 
a practicaaly a nationwide basis , we can expect an out in 
other states similar to New York . There is a belief that 
anything would be better than a continuance of this rate 
war which is going on in the automobile field under the guise 
of merit or safe driver rating and economy plans, the fear 
being that it can only end in disaster for private enterprise 
in automobile underwriting . 
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CHAPTER XIV 
BASIC WEAKNESSES IN SAFE DRIVER PLANS 
In automobile underwriting it may take a seem-
ingly long time for ill-conceived rating and underwriting 
procedures to prove that they are just that , and nothing 
else , the day of reckoning does arrive . 
Although it cannot be said at this time that a 
complete awarness to the fundamental weaknesses of safe 
driver plans has actually occurred on an industry- wide basis , 
it is becoming apparent that top ~anagement of some companies 
have misgivings regarding them. In the State of California 
where the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters chose to 
inaugurate its plan on May l , 1959 we must keep in mind some 
historical facts if we are to see. the full significance of 
what happened there . In its broad outlines , the California 
plan , as originally drawn , applied to the rating of all 
private passenger automobiles that are eligible for coverage 
under the family automobile policy plus assigned risks which 
would otherwise be eligible for family automobiles . The 
coverage under the plan applied to automobile bodily injury 
and property damage as well as medical payments and collision . 
It should be noted that under the original version , 
one point was assigned for ea ch moving traffic violation for 
which the applicant or any operator of a vehicle resident in 
the same household had been convicted as a result of~erating 
any private passenger type of automobile . Also one point was 
assigned for any automobile accident involving the applicant , 
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or any operator of the vehicle resident in the same household, 
while operating any private passenger type automobile, result-
ing in bodily injury or death or in damage to any property , 
including his own, in excess of $50 . Only one point was 
assessed for an accident which also result in a conviction. 
Under the provisions of the California Vehicle Code , a plea 
of guilty or forfeiture of bail is the equivalent of a 
conviction . 
Safe drivers- under the original version of the 
California plan- were defined as those who have not had an 
"accident" for three years . This group were allowed a 20 
percent credit in their rate . At the time the plan was 
announced , the bureaus estimated that only about one half 
of the risks would qualify for this credit . Another quarter 
would be in the one point category- thereby retaining their 
status quo from the standpoint of rates, nei~her debits nor 
credits being assigned to them. It was estimated that the 
remaining quarter of the risks would be subject to debits of 
anywhere from 25 percent to 100 percent . This was expected 
to produce enough additional premiums to off set the effect 
of the 20 percent reduction in rates enjoyed by those drivers 
who have been accident- free for a three year period preceding 
the date of application for insurance . This was the original 
plan put into operation by the National Bureau in California 
on an experimental basis due mainly to the availability of 
individual driver recora s maintained by the Department of 
Motor Vehicles of that state. 
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When the National Bureau labeled this plan "experi-
mental" it apparently was an invitation for pressure, partie-
ularly from the agents, not only to suggest but actually 
campaign for some radical changes . For an example is the 
fact that the plan had been in force only a few weeks when 
it was found necessary or advisable to revise the plan in 
such a manner that a motorist who could demonstrate that he 
was not at fault in an accident would escape the assignment 
of a point . This was accomplished by expanding the list of 
accident situations in which the motorist would be deemed 
not to have been at fault . Also the driving period upon 
which rates are based was shortened to two years . The plan 
was also revised to provide that risks with new drivers who 
also had their license less than two years would be eligible 
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for the "safe driver" discounts if their point record should 
warrant a reduction . Under the original plan , a risk with 
an inexperienced driver was not eligible for the discount . 
A further indication of the pressure to lower the 
gates for the less fortunate drivers is found in the fact 
that in a matter of weeks the surcharges were reduced so that 
even risks with two points against them would pay only the 
basic rate- that is , the rate that applied before the plan 
went into operation . A significant change was the softening 
of the effect of the first point for a chargeable accident or 
moving traffic violation . Under the revised plan , policy-
holders who met with their first accident or moving traffic 
violation could still have a 10 percent reduction from the 
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basic rate , unless the conviction was for one of these five 
serious violations : Reckless driving ; drunken driving ; hit 
and run ; driving while license is suspended or revoked ; or 
homicide or assault arising out of the operation of a motor 
vehicle. Applicants with no points would still get a 20 
percent reduction in premium . 
On the face of these changes- particularly the 
shortening of the experience period and the general easing--
up on the assignment of points- it made the California plan 
less appea ling to the company managements than was the case 
when the original plan was announced . It was apparent that 
when you shorten the experience period from three years to 
two years , and at the same- time give "first timers" in acci-
dents and certain moving traffic violations a discount of 10 
percent , there is more than a slight possibility that the 
plan has already started to move in the direction which 
spelled doom to so many safe driver or merit rating plans of 
past years . Inher.ent in · p.ractically all of these plans--
particularly those where there is little or no policing- is a 
definite tendency to gradually let down the bars between 
classifications to such a degree that an unreasonably large 
number of policyholders come to qualify for the highest 
discount- thereby , in effect , bringing about a sizable reduc-
tion in the basic rate prevailing at the time of adoption of 
the plan . 
The California plan did face up to this situation. 
We then saw that the very people who clamored the loudest for 
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an easing- up of the qualifications for the largest discount 
under the original plan pointing an accusing finger at 
bureau companies for what they term "highly selective under-
writing ." This refers to the agents- particularly the members 
of the California Association of Insurance Agents- who , forget-
ful of the important part they played a few months before in 
making the California plan a vehicle for wholesale and 
indiscriminate rate cuts- and then advocating that those 
companies which showed a thoroughly proper disposition to 
underwrite their business be placed upon a black list . In 
the situation of this time, it must have been annoying to 
member companies of the National Bureau who, only a few months 
earlier in Chicago , heard from Mr . Roger Chickering of Oak-
land , California- a member of the National Board of State 
Directors of the National Association of Insurance Agents-
some high praise for their promptness in adjusting the Cali-
fornia plan in accordance with the suggestions from agents . 
As it turned out it would have been better if the 
bureau companies had not listened to the agents who apparently 
believed that a safe driver plan relieves the company of all 
responsibility in underwriting . They do not seem to under-
stand that a risk calling for a debit , even as high as 100 
percent , is still likely to be a bad risk and one to be 
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avoided by a company management with a wholesome respect for 
its primary responsiblity to make a profit for its stockholders . 
This was affirmed by State Director Chickering 
during his address at a meeting in Chicago stating , as he did , 
that in refusing 100 percent debit risks the companies "were 
forgetting how to do their arithmetic . " It might be said 
here that no one has ever successfully challenged the 
specialty writers in the automobile field of any lack of 
ability to add and subtract and yet they haven't shown any 
great dispositionm voluntarily write this type of problem 
risk . Be that as it may, it can be hoped that the bureau 
companies will not succumb any more to the entreaties of the 
agents on these safe driver plans . There is a limit to which 
the voice of the producing forces in the old line stock 
companies should be allowed to prevail in determining manage-
ment policy . It should not be forgotten that the agents job 
is to produce and the company should never delegate its 
responsibility to underwrite, no matter what the consequences 
may be in the way of building up resistance from the agents . 
Once his risk is written the agent can "go to bed with the 
comforting assurance that he has added more dollars to his 
commission account, but also it is the company officals who 
must be awake at night wondering just what the risk is going 
to produce in the way of losses . " As far as the agent is 
concerned the more undesirable the risk, the less sales effort 
is involved . In most cases it is salesmanship in reverse with 
the client persuading the agent to try to find some company 
upon which he can use a lever to accept the risk . 
Therefore it would appear from events in California 
that the chances of survival of merit rating plans or safe 
driver plans is a small one . It comes down to history 
lll 
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repeating itself in that we are witnessing the course of 
events which spelled the beginning of the end for previous 
attempts by the National Bureau to apply the merit rating 
principle to automobile underwriting . 1/lhatever one may choose 
to call these plans , they are designed to capture what is left 
of the good business and throw the bad into the unwanted group . 
As time goes on , not only are the companies being pressured 
into accepting the unwanted group but pressured also to 
upgrade the less desirable risks into preferred classifica-
tions to which they have no right . All with the result that 
having started with a basic rate which was in most instances 
inadequate , the companies find themselves in the position of 
writing the automobile business at a substantial loss on an 
overall basis . At the same time facing a disgruntled minority 
group of policyholders threatening to appeal to the legisla-
tures to limitprivate enterprise in automobile underwriting . 
How long the National Bureau will stay with safe 
driver plans in California and other states is not know~ . But 
this much is certain that the managements of the member 
companies will have to make up their minds whether they want 
volume under pressure from the agents or sound underwriting . 
This is only saying that when it comes to a choice of freedom 
to underwrite on a sound basis and the perpetration of a plan 
which tends to eliminate such freedom, there isn ' t any quest -
ion that the latter should be scrapped . Business captured at 
a loss is of no value to a company . This is exactly what is 
happening under these latter- day safe driver plans which were 
born of too much emphasis upon merchandising and too little 
upon the right of selection . 
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CHAPTER XV 
MERIT RATING UNSOUND 
The principal problem that captial stock companies , 
operating through independent agents , are attempting to solve , 
is how to secure a representative book of average business 
and to provide a broad equitable market without losing money . 
Unfortunately , specialty writers ' activities were 
not considered too seriously in the post- war period . They 
were permitted to become established , and syphoned away about 
60% of the private passenger bus iness , of which 100% was of 
the preferred type . This left about 40% for the independent 
agents and their companies , of which 75% was preferred and 
25%, or the 10 risks out of each 100 , representing the poor-
est , which agency companies were obliged to take because of 
"agency leverage ." 
Two specialty writers alone boast of writing 20% 
of all the private passenger business . Under their produc-
tion and underwriting program they ac cept and renew only the 
best of the best classification . These two , in addition to 
the remaining specialty companies , have effectively syphoned 
a way from the regular agency companies the bulk of the 
preferred auto business . 
Obviously by writing only the best of the best 
classification they have prospered and grown and become more 
aggressive . Meanwhile contemporary agency companies , 
receiving a smaller part of the preferred and all of the 
worst classification (other than assigned risk business ) 
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suffered retrogressed and were forced to adopt restrictive 
underwriting practices . 
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Most specialty writing automobile companies of all 
types and categories, while benefitting from the rates 
established by the average risk of each classification, confine 
their operations to accepting only the best of each classifi-
cation and thus make no contribution toward accepting their 
share of marginal or poor risks . This results in defensive 
underwriting by the captal stock agency companies in the 
interest of establishing a · representative book of business. 
This in turn, creates a tight market in the business and 
results in a disproportionate volume of marginal business 
being needlessly relegated to the Assigned Risk Pool. 
The automobile problem has been with the industry 
for a great many years and it has failed to face up to it. 
The industry has improvised, and "swept the problem under 
the rug." It has rationalized and temporized with all sorts 
of make-shift expedients, and fought at best a delaying action. 
The over-refinement in risk classification has 
developed to the point where a slightly below average risk 
pays prohibitive rates or is denied coverage on a voluntary 
basis. This has permitted the specialty writers to flourish. 
Admittedly, reasonable operational and territorial classifi-
cations are essential and the known accident repeater should 
be severely penalized if he cannot be denied the use of the 
highway. Beyond this point "Automobile Liability risks are 
more dissimilar than similar, and further refinement is not 
only rank discrimination and inimical to the very mathematical 
science of insurance, but is against public welfare."* 
If the industry is to satisfy its public trust, it 
must find a voluntary way to provide the protection required 
by society for all the 80,000,000 motorists on the highway 
today, and not just the preferred 50%. All segments of the 
business must do their full share . This cannot be done by 
permitting over-refinement in risk classification nor by 
catering almost exclusively to the risk with little exposure. 
The industry has lost over one-half billion dollars 
during the post-war years from Automobile insurance, and 
sustained losses in all but three of the past 18 years. 
Notwithstanding the substantial rate increases 
granted during the past years and the relatively little 
change in the cost of living index, we have witnessed little, 
if any, improvement in Automobile Bodily Injury Liability 
experience. At the same time, Motor Vehicle accident 
frequency in relation to population, registered number of 
cars and miles driven, is at an all time low. 
The number and incidence of claims against insured 
motorists have increased over the past two years, after 
steadily declining during the post-war period. This is due 
partly to the larger number of youthful operators and 
increased claim consciousness of the public resulting from 
enactment of Compulsory Liability Statutes. It is also due 
to increased rates and widely disseminated publicity concern-
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ing automobile accidents. 
Since the adoption of the present 6 classification 
plan about eight years ago, Automobile Liability insurance 
has been getting progressively worse each year and Policy 
Year Experience increased steadily every single year from 
64% in 1953. 
The chances of misclassification of risks increase. 
Ofttimes the misclassifications are deliberate, and other 
times result from competitive practices. 
Each year since the adoption of the 6 classification 
plan the number of risks classified in the preferred class 
increased, and those classified as business use, or with 
youthful operators, correspondingly decreased. This not-
withstanding the fact that each year more and more people 
are using automobiles for driving to work, the number of 
youthful drivers is steadily increasing, and the number of 
private passenger automobiles used for business purposes is 
on the increase. This would indicate that improper class-
ification of risks is an important contributing factor to 
the continuing ·poor experience for automobile insurance by 
ca~tal stock agency companies . 
THE PREFERRED- BUSINESS MONOPOLY 
Companies catering exclusively to the ultra 
selective, low loss producing group have been able to 
maintain their substantial advantage in loss ratios compared 
with other companies transacting an across the board business, 
making their full facilities available to all classifications 
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of risks and accepting the bitter with the sweet. 
The specialty writers have redoubled their efforts 
to syphon off additional preferred business through an even 
more aggressive merchandising program spearheaded by radio, 
television and extensive consumer advertising in daily papers, 
periodicals and billboards. Their advertising budget alone 
is 600% more than agency companies. 
The principal unsolved problem then, in the 
automobile liability field, for agency companies, continues 
to be the syphoning of preferred business at attractive rates 
by the specialty writers, leaving a sub-standard portfolio 
of business for agency companies . 
Now 80% of the families in American own automobiles. 
Inter-city travel by automobile has tripled since the War 
and has practically replaced other means of transportation 
for short travel . The continuing move to the suburbs can 
be expected to increase the future utilization of private 
passenger automobiles . 
When the bumper crop of post-war babies reaches 
driving age, the industry will have a real problem on its 
hands, if it has not previously been solved. 
Admittedly, the male owners or operators under 25 
contribute to a disporportionate number of accidents in 
relation to the ideal group of 25-65, but how can one attain 
the preferred age group of 25-65 without having first endured 
the dangerous 16-24 era. 
This group constitutes over 12% of the business 
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which will be increasing substantially in future years . 
The 16- 24 group has reached the lowest point in a 
quarter cen~y but will increase about three times as fast as 
the rest of the population by 1975 and will number some 35 
million . Over two- thirds of first marriages are in this 
group and will reach three million marriages per year by 1970. 
66% of families in this group have automobiles, including 2% 
owning two or more and 20% of these cars are purchased new . 
This gr.oup will augment the new mass market earning between 
$3 , 000 and $15 , 000 per annum that already accounts for 64% of 
our spending units and 81% of money income. They are import-
ant to the industry as they make up a large proportion of our 
newly formed households and fo rm buying habits , many of which 
persist for years . 
We cannot expect the business men of the future to 
support the independent agencies and the free enterprise 
system of distributing insurance if we do not take car of 
them now . 
Companies are anxious to see qualified young people 
mter the agency field as a business career . Since it is 
generally accepted that "each generation sells its generat-
tion" how can we encourage young , new agents to develop 
business if the industry refuses to insure their contempor-
' aries? 
Some companies are now using 35 to 40 different 
classifications and are so selective that if there appears 
to be any real exposure to risk , such risks are unacceptable . 
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This is not insurance , and is against public interest . 
Actually the best of the worst classification 
produces a lower loss cost and is deserving of more reco-
gnition than the worst of the best classification . Such 
risks are easily identified and amenable to selection . 
A continuation of this ultra- selective classifica-
tion in underwriting will have but one alternative , and that 
will be State funds , or introduction of a schedule of benefits 
irrespective of fault , and the end of automobile insurance 
as we know it today . 
It is clear that under present accepted practices 
of producing and servicing business , the industry can never 
hope to compete on the basis of the expense componet part of 
the premium dollar alone . However , given a fair opportunity 
to compete for the " sweet " and with specialty writers should-
ering their fair share of the "bitter", the capital stock 
companies can easily offset the 15 point difference in loss 
ratios on the basis of a 100 cent dollar . With reduced 
acquisition , the differential in rate levels should be less 
than 10%. 
This is an industry problem and requires the 100% 
cooperation of all companies . The only way this can be 
accomplished is to limit the number of classifications for 
rate making purposes for private passenger automobile 
liability insurance . They must be sufficiently broad to be 
equitable, and large enough territorially to merit the test 
of adequacy , reasonableness and stability. 
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There should be no objections to such uniformity, 
since it now exists in Workmen ' s Compensation and would be 
similarly required , if and when a compensation method were 
adopted for automobile insurance . 
Evidently companies ana agents have been unwilling 
or unable to come up with a proper solution- possibly because 
of purely selfish reasons , for the facts are well known . 
This whole program must be revamped . The Gover nor 
of California in 1959 announced that he was considering 
recommending to the special session of the Legislature , a 
compensation plan to be handled by an Automobile Accident 
Commission . 
This could be a forerunner of what ' s to come , and 
it unquestionably will be tried in some jurisdictions . Should 
the present program in California collapse, there is no doubt 
but what the state will be a fertile field for such an 
experiment . 
The business of auto insurance is so important to 
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the continued success of independent agents and their companies 
and has such an outstanding impact on the social and economic 
life of every person that it must be kept with private enter-
prise . It must be restored to an orderly basis and it can 
be done . The action of the ~ureau and the plans that have 
been seen will create more confusion, consternation and 
frustration . It will result in fewer markets and more 
inslovencies . It will not help independent agencies . Already 
more than 200 companies have retired from the auto insurance 
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field in the past ten years either voluntarily or involuntarily . 
This is not good for the business . 
MERIT RATE PLANS UNSOUND 
The introduction of more safe driver plans will 
increase company underwriting losses, further restrict the 
market , materially increase agency expense and reduce comm-
ission earnings . "Such plans are inimical to the very 
fundamental principles of the theory of insurance to wit: 
Dividing the losses of the few among the risks of the many . " 
These plans endeavor to divide "the losses of the few among 
the few loss producers ."* 
The plan as introduced in 1959 was changed on two 
occasions since originally filed , because it was not other-
wise palatable . As amended , most of the "teeth" had been 
eliminated , and proper risk classification was then practic-
ally a matter of opinion or negotiation fostered by "agency 
leverage ." 
This is the fifth safe driver plan that has dis-
tinguished between risks with and without accident that has 
been developed by the Bureau . Each of the four previous 
attempts were shortlived, and failed, and had to be withdrawm 
as not workable . 
An underwriting officer of a large Bureau Company 
which has been a member of the Bureau Rating Committee , in 
summarizing the difficulties encountered in connection with 
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merit rating plans , is quoted as having said , "To make a plan 
saleable , the credit the insured receives for having an 
accident - free record during the experience period must be 
high- say in the neighborhood of 10- 15%. To do this necessi-
tates increasing the base rates almost to the full amount of 
the credit to be given . In any one year 85- 90% of the 
insureds would not have accidents and , therefore , would 
qualify for the merit rating credit which is based on a one 
year experience ." 
" The money to pay for this must come from the base 
rates . This , plus the fact that the cost of administering 
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fue plan is comparatively high , makes it necessary for companies 
to increase the base rate by a factor almost equal to that of 
the merit credit ." This executive continued to point out 
that most of the merit plans involved a complicated inter-
change of experience between companies to check on the 
accident records of drivers who switch from company to company 
when their policies expire . The cost of such an interchange 
becomes prohibitive ."* 
Another underwriting executive of a large and 
prominent Bureau Company which is or has been a member of 
the Bureau Rating Committee was quoted as having said , "Any 
rate structures based on discrimination between the policy-
holder who produces a loss and his fellow who does not , is 
fundamentally at odds with the first principle of insurance ," 
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This gentlemen continued to explain that there is a popular 
misconception about the character of the driver who suffers 
an accident loss . 
"The fact is that out of the great mass of liability 
claims paid , only a portion result from flagrant driving 
misdemeanors . A greater share of them are incurred by people 
of average good driving habits who simply get involved in 
driving situations which we all encounter frequently , but 
which in a certain percentage of cases result in accidents . ~~ ~c 
Another top officer and automobile underwriting 
head of the largest stock agency company is quoted as having 
said that the California Plan is much more complicated and 
subject to greater change than the present classification 
plan . It will fail miserably unless companies and agents are 
willing to spend the extra time , expense and effort to 
administer it accurately . 
Since the introduction of the original Merit 
Program in California , there have already been about 30 
different rating plans announced . "Bureau ~ompanies " 
under the recent liberty granted for "experimentation , " have 
been the forerunners in introducing separate and individual 
programs , using different policy forms , rating methods , and 
commission bases , all adding to the existing consternation 
and frustration . 
Actualy , the competition now is principally between 
agency companies for the remaining preferred business , while 
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the specialty companies continue on their way. 
Recently filed safe driver plans provide for 
discounts of between 5 and 30%. Some require as much as a 
five year chargeable accident and traffic violation free 
record; others are as little as one year and chargeable 
accidents only apply . 
Admittedly , the two or three year record require-
ment , or even the five year record required by one company , 
of accident and abstract free records , as initially required, 
would need less or a rate increase, because fewer risks would 
qualify . The longer the period of eligibility, the greater 
the possiblity of eliminating the accident repeaters and those 
likely to have an accident because of a record of abstracts . 
The application originally required provided a 
penalty for willful misstatements in the application signed 
by the insured . This form has been revised and the new 
signed statement is meaningless and without "teeth" . The 
original application would have permitted the companies to 
underwrite without necessarily resorting to checking prev-
ious experience and public records for accident and traffic 
violation abstracts . The company and agent will find this 
program exceedingly time- consuming and costly to handle for 
both new and renewal business . 
For each $100 . of premium in the past the rating 
formula provided $11 . 50 exclusive of tax , for company oper-
ating expenses , and the agent received $25 . 00 . Now with the 
total production cost factor reduced to 20% the amount 
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available for total company expense is $8 . )6 . The agent 
receives $14 . 53 for that segment of the business written 
at a 20% merit rate . 
Few , if any really good risks , not qualifying for 
a merit rate , will stand still for a rate increase in the 
face of the vast number of available markets still doing 
individual risk underwriting , and offering at least equal 
or lower rates , irrespective of accident or abstract record . 
The business that will be willing to continue on a surcharged 
basis in the face of such competition will represent the 
worst of the class . It will require even substantially 
higher rates than anticipated by the plan and probably will 
end up in the assigned risk pools . 
If the merit rate pl an were adopted by all insurers 
using identical rates on an absolute uniform and obligatory 
basis and there was proper risk classification, then the 
theory of receiving a sufficient surcharge from the 50% or 
more in the demerit classification to offset the reduced 
premium given those in the class would probably work. 
Possibly no rate adjustment would be needed . Since these 
conditions do not and will not prevail under "current rating 
laws ," little, if any , surcharge will be available to offset 
the deficiency on the remaining merited classifications . 
Aside from this , individual risks have already in 
effect been merit- rated by classification and territory . 
Appropriate reduction in rates ha s been granted or rate 
increases have been made depending on accident freque ncy in 
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both the territory and the operational classifications . 
In many states there is as much as a 500% or 
greater difference in expected accident frequency betwean 
territories . The rates properly , and on a merit basis , 
reflect this important factor . Any further distinction in 
penalizing such an insured for having an accident , or reward-
ing one for not having an accident , is unfair discrimination . 
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The preferred classification without youthful 
operators , no business use , and limited driving to work is 
expected to produce about 25% fewer accidents than the average . 
Consequently , the rates are established accordingly and a 
merit credit is granted reflecting lower than average exposure 
and accidents . 
Similarly , the classification with youthful oper-
ators , bus i ne s s use or extensive exposure in driving to and 
from work is exposed to more traffic , has more operators , 
drives a much greater number of miles on main roads and in 
heavy traffic . These drivers operate in all kinds of weather , 
and have a greater record of traffic violations and a much 
higher incidence of accidents . Their current rates are 
already surcharged from 20% to 200% on the basis of dermit . 
These insureds pay up to three times as high a rate as their 
preferred contemporaries . Present rates fully distinguish on 
a meritorious base between classification . To superimpose 
further credits or debits because of the occurence of the 
fortuitous event insured against , is unfair discrimination . 
The merit rating program was initelly filed experi-
mentally in California because of the historic and uniform 
basis of compiling abstracts of traffic violations as well 
as accidents, which were readily available . Few states have 
as an elaborate and reliable record of traffic violations, 
and motor vehicle accidents , as does California. The availa-
bility of such information is obviously essential . 
A review of the California Motor Vehicle Depart-
ment ' s report on traffic violations quite clearly establishes 
the fact that a definite relationship exists between the 
number of abstracts in a driver ' s record and the number of 
accidents he is likely to have . The data compiled in the 
report shows a consistent tendency towards accidents increas-
ing as the number of traffic violations contained in the 
record increased . The report would also confirm the fact 
that the youthful male drivers contribute to a disproportion-
ately large number of traffic violations and subsequent 
accidents, and a clear trend towards improvement in performance 
is indicated with increase in age . It is also clear that 
traffic violations and accidents otherwise are in direct 
proportion to exposure, traffic congestion , mileage and use . 
The study would also indicate that accident prone or accident 
repeaters are responsible for no more than 10% of the 
accidents . In any typical year , 5. 16% of the drivers had 
accident records , and 20 . 05% had record of traffic violations . 
The full three year period reflection 13 . 93 % with accidents, 
or about 10% below the annual rate; and 41 . 23 % with traffic 
violation abstracts , or a decrease of about 30% below the 
annual rate . 
The risk for liability insurance is only average if 
it has one accident involving bodily injury every 17 to 20 
years , and one involving damage to property once every 7 
to 10 years , depending on classification , territory and use . 
Therefore , it is evident that any plan returning as much as 
25 to 30%, as is the case in some states, for three years of 
accident- free operation , is actuarially unsound , unless a 
substantially redundant rate is initiaRy established to 
permit such a credit . Accident repeaters constitute a 
greater than average hazard and should be removed from the 
highways, or subjectr~to serious re- examination . 
The California study would seem to support the 
contention that about 9 out of 10 automobile liability claims 
are incurred by people who are unfortunate enough to get into 
a situation where an accident is unavoidable and yet are to 
be legally responsible . 
The merit rate program then certainly unfairly 
discriminates against this group responsible for 90% of the 
accidents . 
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Utilizing accident records and relying on available 
records of traffic violations could , at most, eliminate that 
segement of accident repeaters which is responsible for produc-
ing no more than ten per cent of the accidents. Relying on 
this information for classification purposes will not develop 
the selective type of underwriting that procures the best , or 
average , risks of a classification. More important is the 
fact that it prevents streamlining, and is extremely time--
consuming and expensive to administer at both the producing 
levels, and does not lend itself to automation. 
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CHAPTER XVI 
ANALYSIS OF A NA TIONVJIDE PROBLEM 
Statistics tell the tragic story. These alarming 
facts show that motor vehicle accidents continue to take a 
heavy toll in deaths and injuries--in spite of the concerted 
efforts of law enforcement agencies and civic organizations . 
Analysis of the problem leads to but one unalterable con-
clusion--the Human Factor is paramount . Historically, it is 
unpredictable . On a hopeful level, however, several suudies 
by responsible groups are now pointing towards a method to 
curb this national problem. 
DEATH BY DRIVING 
Automobile deaths are generally written off as 
so- called accidents . At least one group, howeve~ has 
questioned this pat analysis and is now conducting a serious 
scientific inquiry into the causes of such fatalities . Under 
a research grant from the National Institutes of Health, a 
five - year program of Research on Fatal Highway Collisions 
has been set up by the Department of Legal Medicine at 
Harvard Medical School , under the direction of Alfred L. 
Moseley . The program has just reached its half- way mark; 
the data produced so far raise some interesting questions . 
It is , in a sense , anomalous that highway fatalities 
have not been investigated more thoroughly . In the United 
States alone, 104 people are killed in automobiles every day-
a far greater number than are lost in airplane crashes . Yet 
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every airplane crash i a scrupulously investigated , with 
experts from many fields brought in to study all possible 
aspects of the case . This is not so in the case of auto-
mobile deaths , presumably because it is the consensus that 
the very word " accident " implies lack of control over the 
problem . Also , fewer public agencies are concerned with 
airline affairs than with highway traffic problems ; as a 
practical matter , it is difficult to get many local groups to 
back a coordinated program . 
The group at Harvard has concluded , from its 
detailed analysis of 100 cases , that most fatal accidents 
may not be attributed alon~ to alcohol, speed , fatique , or 
lack of courtesy- the elements commonly associated with death 
on the highway . As a consequence , the research:r~ team is now 
working out recommendations that could be put to practical 
use by drivers , automobile manufa cturers and public officials , 
thereby effectively reducing the number of automobile deaths . 
vfuether later research may suggest refinements in proposed 
regulation or not , the idea of taking the research approach 
to automobile deaths should become familiar now . 
THE TEAMS 
The approach of the Harvard group is multidisci-
plinary . There are two research teams : the operations team, 
which works at the scene of a crash , includes a mechanic , an 
automotive engineer , a traffic engineer , and a man skilled 
in human engineering design ; the clinical team includes a 
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pathologist, a chemist, a laboratory technician, a sociologist, 
a psychiatrist, a psychologist, an internist, an opthalmolo-
gist, an optometrist , a statistician, a lawyer, and a clergy-
man-each one working according to the methods of his own 
profession . 
From its studi~s to date, the team has established 
seven classifications of factors that contribute to highway 
"accidents" The first six are 1) environmental failure, e . g . 
a foggy highway undergoing construction; 2) vehicle failure; 
3) emotional problems of a very severe nature; 4) pathological 
conditions, on the part of either driver or pedestrian, e . g., 
partial blindness , influence of medication, etc .; 5) suicide, 
again on the : part of either pedestrian or driver (and the 
evidence shows that this is by no means a negligible possi-
bility) ; and 6) tampering or foul play. Finally, there 
is a seventh classification- hopotheses-where only the combined 
opinion of the research team is available after thorogh inves-
tigation , and where it appears that analytical methods are not 
yet precise enough to define a true cause . '~ 
To begin with , the team decided to study fatal cases 
involving only a single car colliding with a fixed object; in 
most such cases , there are neither survivors nor witnesses. 
Here the judgment of the team is not colored by hearsay or 
non- expert opinion , but depends rather on its powers of 
observation alone . As the work progresses, however , more 
complicated cases are to be studied , and the team will develop 
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its own methods of dealing with the reactions of survivors and 
the opinions of witnesses who may not necessarily tell the truth . 
As a major result of its preliminary work , the team 
has concluded that automobile deaths should be treated as a 
physician would treat disease- with thorough investigation . 
To paraphrase the words of the director of the program , each 
traffic death should be investigated just as thoroughly as if 
homicide had been committed . This implies a far greater 
degree of cooperation on the part of public officials than is 
now usual , and it also implies an appreciation of the problem 
that extends far beyond present safety campaigns , limited as 
they are in large part to slogan- writing . 
In the meantime , however , research is still needed 
in a number of specific areas . For example, there is a clear 
need to train drivers to handle a car during emergencies 
involving soft tires , panic stops , skidding, blowouts, loss 
of power steering, etc ; current procedures for identifying 
who was actually driving are questionable; we know little 
about how people react to accidents- through amnesia , severe 
neuroses, etc .; and we do npt yet understand the general 
resistance to such safety devices as seat belts and recessed-
post steering wheels . 
HUMAN FACTORS IN MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 
Motor vehicle accidents take about 38 , 000 lives and 
inflict disabling injuries on an additional 1 , 400 , 000 p·ersons 
in the Unites States each year . About 10 , 000 of these deaths 
occur among men in the prime of life-ages 20-39 years; more 
than one fifth of the mortality from all causes combined at 
these ages is due to motor vehicle accidents.* In order to 
reduce the heavy toll of life and limb, psychologists and 
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other scientists working in the safety field have been investi-
gating the role of human factors in the causation of motor 
vehicle accidents and attempted to identify the persons most 
likely to become involved in such accidents. 
These studies indicate the repeated traffic viola-
tions, social maladjustments, and various personality traits 
are indicators of persons most likely to become involved in 
motor vehicle accidents. To begin with, two negative finds 
should be noted. The motor vehicle accident record of indi-
viduals ia little influenced by such factors as coordination, 
reaction time, visual and auditory discrimination, and 
physical condition, other than gross defects adversely 
affecting operation of a motor vehicle. Secondly, although 
some persons are more susceptible to accidents than others, 
repeaters account for only a small proportion of motor vehicle 
accidents. For example, studies made some years ago of drivers 
involved in accidents in Comnecticut showed that the repeater 
contributed only 3 or 4 percent of the accidents. 
A number of studies have demonstrated that drivers 
who commited traffic violations not involving accidents are 
more likely to have traffic accidents than those who have not 
been charged with such violations. A major investigation in 
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this field is the re s earch project which won the first 
Metropolitan Life Awar d fo r Research in Accident Prevention 
two years ago . The study , based on the records of 40,467 
drivers licensed in North Carolina , showed that the number of 
accidents per driver increased from . 167 for those who had 
had no violations to 1 . 001 for drivers with five prior 
violations . 
In another study by the same investigators , the 
records concerning violations by about 1 , 100 drivers involved 
in fatal accidents were compared with an equal number selected 
at random . The drivers with such accidents had 50 percent 
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more violations prior to the accident than did the random group . 
Another means of predicting whether a driver is 
likely to become involved in fatal accidents is the total of 
motor vehicle violation points he has accumulated . An exten-
sive study in the Province of Manitoba , covering the years 
1955- 59 , showed that of licensed drivers (excluding beginning 
drivers) with no previous record of point violations only 2 . 4 
per 10 , 000 were involved in fatal accidents . The rate was 
twice as high for drivers with l - 5 points , and rose sharply 
to 69 . 1 per 10 , 000 for those who had accumulated 6- 7 points. 
A number of other investigations show similar 
results , but only one additional study need be cited. The 
accident records of more than 2 , 400 men, in Iowa were obtained 
from the State license files , supplemented by data from a 
questionnaire sent to each person in the sample . The ratio 
of the actual number of accidents to the number expected , 
based on the experience of the entire sample, was 85 percent 
among drivers with one violation and 134 percent among those 
with two or three violations . "Speeding" was the moving 
traffic violation which had the highest association with 
accidents; next in rank were "improper passing" and failure 
to observe stop signs . 
Life insurance companies have long been aware that 
socially maladjusted individuals are more likely to be 
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involved in accidents than are those without such difficult= 
ies . In this context, the socially maladjusted include persons 
who have had credit difficulties, a record of juvenile or 
adult court offenses against persons or property, and 
truancy from school . 
Behavioral scientists now generally recognize that 
basic personality characteristics and attitudes of drivers 
are specific factors in the causation of violations and 
accidents . Some investigators have reported a considerable 
degree of success in prognosticating driver performance by 
analysis of personality traits, such as sense of social 
responsibility, acceptance of authority, and aggressiveness. 
This field of research , however , is still in the early stages 
of development and the results so far are by no means 
definitive . 
CHAPTER XVII 
CAUSES AND PROPOSED CURES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 
September of 1899 was the first time on record that a 
United States citizen had been killed in an auto accident . 
Since then , the automobile has killed nearly a 
million and a half people and permanently crippled 4,000 , 000 
others , a toll unequalled by war or natural calamity . Each 
new year sees the lives of almost 40 , 000 more men, women and 
children sacrificed to the auto . Over 100,000 others are 
maimed for life . Another 4 , 000 , 000 suffer injuries , some 
slight , some severe . 
Only heart ailments , cancer and pneumonia rank ahead 
of death on the highways as a destroyer of human life . Yet 
none of these diseases hits harder at the people in whom the 
vigor and promise of the nation are centered ; among those be-
tween l and 36 years of age , death by auto is the number one 
killer . 
Shocking statistics? Yes , but for most people 
that ' s all they are- just numbers , cold and impersonal, noth-
ing more . The truth is that the American public just doesn ' t 
care about the needless slaughter on the highways . 
Why the apathy? For the average motorist , the pro-
spect of death is unreal . Accidents are things that happen 
to other people, not him . After all , he obeys the traffic 
laws (practically always) , and anyhow he ' s a skillful enough 
driver to avoid an accident . He thinks the accident rate is 
terrible , and he ' s all in favor of a crackdown- just as long 
as it doesn ' t inconvenience him . 
Perhaps he ' s also overwhelmed by the size of the 
problem- unsafe drivers , unsafe cars , unsafe roads ; legislators 
afraid to crack down on violators ; court that brush off 
homicide by auto and invoke only the lightest penalties . 
0mall wonder , then , that the average motorist is apt to 
threw up his hands and sink back into ~nertia, saying "What ' s 
the use? It ' s just too big to do anything about . " 
Something , however , can be done to lick the epide-
mic of death on the highways . Wi pe it out? No, probably 
never , but cut it down to size , yes . The views of scores of 
state and local highway officia ls , traffic engineers , auto 
insurance men , physicians , educators , researchers and car 
makers have been sought but not everyone sees eye to eye . 
On some issues there is sharp disagreement . But on one thing 
the experts are nearly unanimous : no short cuts , no simple 
panaceas can cope with a problem whose sauses are monstrously 
complex . The way to get meaningful results is through a broad 
attack on all three inevitable components of an auto accident-
the driver , the car and the road . 
Here , distilled from the experts ' recommendations, 
is one set of proposals to do the job . It doesn ' t cope with 
every last problem , nor is it the only way , but it will serve 
as a starter . 
THE UNFIT DRIVER 
Most accidents are caused by the mistakes and short-
comings of the driver , not the auto or the road . It isn ' t 
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necessarily the incompetent or irresponsible motorist who 
causes all the trouble either. even the usually "safe" driver 
can make the one little mistake that leads to disaster. But 
the misfit behind the wheel is at least a clear target on 
whom sights can be fixed. 
To begin with, the experts say, a license to drive 
must be recognized as a privilege rather than a r~ght. It 
should be tougher to get a license and easier to take one 
away from those who are scornful of highway laws. 
Licensing tests vary remarkably from state to state, 
but the most common characteristic is that they are sketchily 
and hurriddly given. If the appli~ant can turn the key , 
start the car and put on the brakes, chances are that he will 
get a license. But simple as this test may be , the medical 
part is even more lax. 
Pennsylvania is the only state that requires a 
physical exam as part of the licensing process. In the others, 
the applicant, in theory, may be denied a license if he has 
a disabling injury or disease. But in practice it's up to 
the examiner to spot the defect; beyond that, the driver's 
word is taken. Once he gets a license, he can usually drive 
for a lifetime with little trouble . Injury, disease, mental 
deterioration may befall him, but unless he is found out, he 
is free to stay on the road. 
The loophole can be frightening. In Kansas, the 
highway safety director recently discovered that 10% of the 
people receiving state aid for the blind still had drivers' 
140 
licenses . In one of the cities that conducts a clinic for 
chronic traffic violators , 11% of accident-repeaters proved 
to be feeble- minded . 
Or take the problem of the aged . Figures show that 
drivers over 65 have an accident rate double that of all 
drivers . With oldsters making up an ever- growing portion of 
the population, the danger is bound to grow unless those 
among them whose ability to drive has been impaired are denied 
licenses . 
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PROPOSAL : Stiffer licensing requirements, including a thorough 
medical examination . In addition , a driver would have to take 
a physical periodically to keep his license . 
The applicant could be examined by his own doctor . 
(The American Medical Association has already issued a guide 
for physicians to help determine a patient ' s fitness to drive . ) 
Generally, he would be denied a driver ' s license only for 
major defects. For example , poor vision even with glasses; 
severe heart trouble or high blood pressure ; severe nervous 
or psychiatric disorders ; uncontrolled epilepsy, diabetes or 
other conditions that cause temporary blackouts; chronic 
alcoholism. 
TEEN- AGERS 
Physically, the teen- age driver is probably the 
best qualified on the road . Yet the performance of young 
motorists can be appalling . Teen- agers get into accidents 
at a rate two and a half times that of all drivers . 
The problem, of course, is not physical but 
emotional . To the adolescent, expecially the male, a car is 
a symbol of independence . By taking risks with it, by trying 
out his prowess in fast driving , he makes the car a testing 
ground for his masculinity . 
In short, too many teen- agers are plainly immature , 
lacking in judgment or the proper attitude toward safety. 
And yet most states grant licenses to children of 15 or 16 , 
some even younger . And parents yield to pressure to let their 
youngsters drive early . 
PROPOSAL : Raise the minimum age for new drivers to 18 . But 
waive the rule for youngsters over 16 who have passed a certi-
fied high school driver education course, that is, one offer-
ing 30 hours of classroom work and six hours of practiced 
driving with a qualified teacher . 
Thisfu the plan pioneered in Michigan . Putting 
the minimum age even higher than 18 presents the danger of 
making sneak drivers out of impatient youngsters . At the 
same time, the plan offers an automatic incentive for children 
to enroll in high school driving courses . Students who take 
these courses have far fewer accidents, on those who don ' t . 
About three- fourths of the public schools offer 
driver education courses, though not all are up to standard . 
(Some commercial courses measure up to standards, but a great 
many do not . ) It ' s up to the parent to see that his child 
takes the course if it is available, or campaign for one if 
it is not . * 
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STRICTER ENFORCE~lliNT 
Tougher screening may keep physically unfit or im-
mature drivers off the road, but it can only skim the surface. 
How can you get at the potential killers who slip through or 
are already licensed? 
The answer lies, at least in part, in the link 
between traffic violators and highway accidents. According 
to Mr. Thomas Boate, head of the Accident Prevention Depart-
ment of the Association of Casualty and Surety Companies, 
"From 76% to 90% of the drivers involved in accidents had 
committed one or more traffic violations." The idea, then, 
is not just to punish traffic violators after they have had 
accidents , but to prevent them from doing damage in the first 
place. 
DRINKING DRIVERS 
Almost all accidents have a number of causes. But 
one that shows up quite often is alchol. Consider: 
l. In montana, during a test period, 4S% of 
drivers killed in auto crack-ups were drunk . 
2. In Westchester County, N.Y., over an eight--
year period, 49% of all drivers in fatal 
single-car smashups were drunk, and another 
24% were almost drunk or getting over one . 
3. In Buffalo, N. Y., investigators picked a 
random stretch of road and compared drivers 
involved in crashes with those who passed 
by untouched . Result: 55% of those in 
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accidents had been drinking compared with 
only 13% among those who went unscathed . '~ 
Yet for all the well- documented proof, myths die 
hard . How many times have you heard , "Alcohol doesn ' t 
affect me because I ' ve built up a tolerance for it ." Or "I 
can drive as well or better after a few drinks ." Or "One 
little drink won ' t hurt me . " 
Such comments reveal a popular misconception about 
alcohol and driving . The big problem is not the reeling 
"drunkenn driver . He ' s dangerous , sure , but he ' s not as 
common as the "drinking " driver , the one who ' s had just a 
few beers or highballs and doesn ' t recognize that his judg-
ment , reflexes and vision are impaired . 
One research study cited by the United States 
Government says that the person whose blood contains more 
than 0 . 15% alcohol gets into accidents at a rate ten times 
faster than the driver who is sober . But to get to that level 
the average man would have to drink in one hour 7~ ounces of 
hard liquor- five strong drinks- or ten bottles of beer . 
Look at the social drinker . If his blood-alcohol 
level is 0. 05% to 0 . 10% (2~ to 5 ounces of liquor in an hour), 
his chances of getting into a crash are, on the average, 50% 
greater than those of the nondrinker . At 0 . 10% to 0 . 15%, 
they are 150% higher . 
Yet state laws have lagged far behind mounting medi-
cal evidence . In most places a driver still has to register 
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a blood- alcohol level of 0 . 15% before he ' s presumed to be 
drunk . Theoretically , he can also be convicted of driving 
while under the influence if his blood contains only 0 . 05% . 
But for levels less than 0. 15%, additional proof is needed, 
and this is often hard to come by . Furthermore , the arrest-
ing officer knows how hard it is to convict a drinking driver 
in the face of tolerant judges and juries . So he ' s inclined 
to make a lesser charge . 
In many jurisdictions , a driver can even refuse 
to take an alcohol test- such as a chemical analysis of his 
breath , blown into a ballon- without any penalty . Only ten 
states or so have so--called "implied consent" laws , under 
which a driver ' s license is automatically revoked if he 
refuses to submit to a chemical test when arrested on a 
drunken- driving charge . 
In Massachusetts a driver can be fined $1,000 . 
and imprisioned for two years on a first offense for drunken 
driving . Along with this a potential loss of license for 
one year . If the driver were also unfortunate enough to kill 
someone else while driving under the influence , he could lose 
his license for 10 years . 
Let us compare this with penalties in the 
country of Norway , where a drunken driver is jailed for three 
weeks and loses his license for one year . This is Norway ' s 
answer to the drunken driving problem and it has proved 
eminently effective be cause they actually enforce the law . 
In Massachusetts , while we know that on paper 
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our penalties are severe, few drunken drivers go to jail . 
There are laws pn our books to deal severley with all traffic 
offenders, but they are applied with great variation in the 
courts . If a judge wants to jail a driver, there are laws 
that make this possible . 
We actually find that 50 percent of the defendants 
who appeal "wet driving" convictions imposed by district court 
judges in ~fussachusetts are subsequently acquited by Superior 
Court juries . In Norway , if a driver is stopped by the police 
and refuses to subject himself to a blood test and clinical 
examination , the police will immediately revoke his license 
for a minimum of two years . Under these circumstances the 
driver is not jailed . With this strict enforcement they have 
reduced deaths by car accidents per 100 , 000 inhabitants to 
8. 6 persons . In the United States this figure is 21 . 5 
persons . 
PROPOSAL : Reduce to at least 0 . 10%, and preferably to 0. 05%, 
the blood- alcohol level at which a driver is automatically 
presumed to be drunk . All states should compel drivers 
charged with drunken driving to undergo a test for alcohol 
or else lose their licenses . 
SPEEDERS 
A growing number of traffic safety authorities now 
believe that the danger of high speeds, as such, has been 
overrated . For example, a study by John 0 . Moore, former 
director of the Automotive Crash Injury Research at Cornell 
University, indicated that in three- fourths of auto accidents 
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the cars involved were traveling under 60 miles per hour, 
But if the danger of high speed has been exaggerated, 
the danger of excessive speeds has not . The two are not 
necessarily the same . Forty- miles an hour, a relatively 
modest speed these days, may be too high around a curve 
built for 30 or in a neighborhood full of side streets and 
children . Driving too fast is still listed as a contributing 
cause to one- third of fatal accidents . And the faster a car 
is traveling when it runs into trouble, the greater the odds 
the passengers will be injured, and the more severe the injury 
will be . 
Some critics claim too many police make a fetish 
out of enforcing speed laws . But states that crack down on 
speeders, such as Connecticut and Pennsylvania, do cut into 
traffic fatalities . Moreover, when motorists slow down, they 
generally drive more carefully all- around. 
The nub of the problem is not too much enforcement, 
but not enough. It is a two-pronged problem; too few police 
and too little respect for the law . The two are often inter-
twined. 
Certain studies show that of every 2,000 drivers 
who exceed the speed limit only one gets caught. If you were 
one of the 1,999 that got away, you would probably keep right 
on speeding. And if you were caught, you might be angered 
at the inequity of it all . 
No one expects every speeder to be caught. But 
closer police surveillance will spot more violators and prod 
more drivers to keep within speed limits. Yet police agencies 
are perpetually strapped for funds and are consequently under-
manned and underequipped. 
To make the most out of the resources at hand, high-
way police in many places resort to unorthodox moves to keep 
violators in line-such things as spot checks of drivers and 
autos, unmarked police cars, and station wagons with large 
speedometers bolted to the top. 
Some of these devices come in for attack. Unmarked 
cars, according to the American Automobile Association, are 
unsportsmanlike. But driving, after all, is hardly a game. 
It is a matter of life and death, and police gimmicks , when 
publicized in advance, do cut down speeding and traffic acci-
dents. 
PROPOSAL: State and lical budgets for highway police should 
148 
be greatly increased. And police effectiveness should be 
stretched with radar, unmarked patrol cars and similar devices. 
Unrealistic speed limits, usually on the low side, 
also complicate things. There are few motorists who haven't 
rankled over some absurdly low speed limit somewhere. On 
some sections of the four-lane Palisades Interstate Parkway 
that runs through New York and New Jersey, for example, speed 
limits of 40 m.p.h. arB posted but rarely observed. Yet a 
parallel two-lane route nearby unaccountably has a 50 m.p.h. 
limit. It's no wonder then that many motorists have such an 
offhand attitude toward the law. 
Or take the slowpoke driver. The motorist who per-
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sists in driving slowly and holding up a line of cars may 
cause an accident by goading drivers to the point where they 
will pass unwisely and hazardously . Most states, in theory , 
give tickets to such drivers , but few actually post minimum 
speed limits . And Highway troopers tend to ignore the creeper . 
PROPOSAL : Set realistic speed limits , determined by traffic 
engineering studies and not by guesswork , obsolete laws and 
outmoded conditions . This should include the posting of mini-
mum limits , at least on high- speed roads . 
Safety experts believe f air speed limits will incre-
ase the motorists ' respect for traffic laws generally . What ' s 
more , they would probably free some traffic police from the 
superhighways , where accident rates are lowest anyhow , for 
duty on roads where accidents require tougher enforcement . 
TAKING THE LICENSE AWAY 
Stricter enforcement doesn ' t end with catching more 
violators . Paying a fine may straighten out some drivers , 
but it leaves no lasting impre s sion on too many others . The 
violator must be hit where it hurts- if he won ' t drive to save 
his life , he wi ll to save his license . 
PROPOSAL : Suspend for one year the license of a motorist con-
victed of driving under the influence of alcohol . Three 
convictions and his license would be lifted for life . 
PROPOSAL : For speeding by more than , say , five or ten miles 
over the limit , a first conviction would cost the driver this 
license for 30 days, a second, 60 days . A motorist convicted 
three times within a short period , say 18 months, would lose 
his license for six months or l onger . 
THE ORDINARY DRIVER 
Taking incompetent drivers and habitual violators 
off the road is no cure- all . Sure , these people kill and maim 
at a savage rate . But the ordinary driver , the person who 
rarely if ever gets in trouble with the law , does his share , 
too . In fact , it ' s this average driver who gets into most 
accidents . He may have a momentary lapse of attention, make 
an error in judgment or drive while fatiqued . How can we 
cope with the human element? 
There is no simple answer . Scare campaigns to keep 
drivers on their toes do not work , the experts agree . Tighter 
law enforcement may help some . Decades from no~ , electronic 
devices in car and highway may take over the driving and 
eliminate human fallibility . 
But until then , accidents will happen . The logical 
step , then , is to reduce the damage they can do . And for 
that , we must look to the car itself . 
CRASHPROOFING THE AUTO 
There ' s a saying among safety experts that the 
driver may cause the accident , but the car causes the injury . 
In every serious accident , there are not one but two crashes : 
1) the car hits something and then , 2) the occupant bangs into 
something . 
Ordinarilly , the passenger in a crash has very 
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little protection . But in r ecent years researchers have 
worked out a concept known as "pa ckaging" the occupant . It 
involves these three principles . 
l . Keep the passenger from flying out the door . 
2 . Hold him down so he won ' t smash into interior 
surfaces of the car . 
3 . Cushion the places the unrestrained passenger 
is most likely to smash into . 
EJECTION 
Doors often come open under the impact of a crash. 
Your chances of escaping alive are much better if you stay 
inside the car than if you are hurled out the door . In fact, 
if passengers in a crash could always be kept inside the car, 
researchers claim, one of every seven people who now die in 
mishaps could be saved . 
The most practical approach is to build locks that 
will keep doors shut on impact . Back in 1956 , auto makers 
introduced a safety lock that reduced passenger ejection by 
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40%. In the last year , a stronger lock has been introduced, 
though it ' s still expected to fall far short of 100% efficiency . 
A second approach is to provide seat belts to hold 
passengers in the car even if doors do open. Many tests have 
been made to measure how well seat belts perform. The result , 
stated conservatively , boil down to this : If you are wearing 
a seat belt in an accident , your chances of being killed or 
seriously injured will be reduced by more than one- third . 
RESTRAINT 
Seat belts, of course, help even when the door 
stays shut. They may keep you from ramming into the wheel, 
dashboard, windshield or other hard surface. Another widely 
supported proposal is to build seats higher or at least attach 
hea.P.rests. This would protect the passenger from neck snap 
or whiplash injury, a frequent result of rear-end collisions. 
SOFTER SURFACES 
If everything else fails, the severity of an injury 
can be reduced by cushioning the blow . Here are some ways 
physicians and researchers say this might be done. 
1. Crash padding of the dashboard, roof, the 
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back of the front seat and other impact areas.' 
2 . A collapsible steering column with a padded 
center post. The steering column, built 
something like a telescope, would collapse 
on impact with the driver's chest. The 
dished steering wheel, with recessed center 
post, now common to most cars hasn't cut down 
on chest injuries as much as designers thought 
it would. 
3 . Removal of protruding knobs, buttons and 
handles. Sharp edges, for example the angular 
hood projection above the dashboard panel in 
cars, should also be smoothed out. 
Most of these features could be added for $100 . Auto 
makers do increase the safety of their cars year by year. 
r 
•. 
But like as not , a new safety feature , such as dashboard pad-
ding , may be an optional extra , which often discourages a 
would- be buyer . And often the changes come only after pres--
sure by state legislatures ••• 
In any case , Detroit has not moved as fast on car 
safety as the vast majority of medical , police and highway 
experts think it should . Detroit ' s answer is that as soon 
as enough customers have expressed interest in having them , 
it does install safety devices . In the competitive auto 
business , most car makers are loath to add to the cost of the 
car unless it brings in more sales- as fancy styling and 
souped- up engines seem to do . 
It ' s true enough that the public doesn ' t seem to 
care about car safety . Take the case of seat belts . Only a 
fraction of car owners have taken the trouble to install them , 
though the number is increasing . Even then , seat belts aren ' t 
used two- thirds of the time . 
PROPOSAL : Let the federal government set minimum safety stan-
dards for new cars , as it already does for planes, boats and 
trains . Among other things , it would spell out the safety 
devices that must be carried as original equipment . 
A bill along these lines has already been introduced 
in Congress . Among the many groups supporting the bill is the 
American Medical Association . 
1THE CONDITION OF THE CAR 
An automobile that ' s abused or poorly maintained 
can also lead to trouble on the highway . In fact, a Harvard 
153 
154 
Medical School project now afoot insists that mechanical 
failure is a more common cause of accidents than has previously 
been supposed . Even where the prime culprit was, say, a 
drinking driver , a faulty brake or steering wheel might very 
well have kept him from pulling out of trouble . 
Eighteen states and the District of Columbia now 
require periodic safety inspection of automobiles . Some 
require an exam once a year, some twice. Some check automobiles 
in state- run stations , some in private garages or service 
stations . 
In all,however, the motrir.ist pays a nominal in-
spection fee . The investigator is supposed to test brakes , 
lights , steering , tires and wheels, windshield, horn and 
wipers . If any are found defective , the motorist must have 
the part repaired before he can go out on the road again . 
Many motorists decry compulsory inspection, claiming 
private stations will find fault just to drum up business . 
That may happen once in a while, but the traffic death rate 
in states requiring inspection runs about 25% lower than in 
those that do not, though other factors may play a role, too , 
PROPOSAL : All states should require inspection of all autos 
twice a year . 
ON THE ROAD 
No other area of highway safety research tas advanced 
as far as the design of road . The new superhighways, with 
their controlled access, wide center strips, four to eight 
lanes and huge signs, are perhaps the greatest single advance 
in preventing automobile accidents . 
When the 41 , 000- mile Interstate Highway System is 
finished in 1973, some highway experts predict it will save 
5,200 lives a year . New roads embodying the latest safety 
features are going up everywhere just about as quickly as 
possible . If new highways can ' t be built much faster , the 
use made of the ones we already have can be vastly improved . 
TRAFFIC ENGINEERING 
Pavement markings . On the road network leading to 
and from the Pentagon in ~ashington, lane marking were 
clearly painted . Result : the ac cident rate dropped 29% . 
Center strips . On the Cross County Parkway in 
Westchester County , N. Y., a metal barrier was placed in the 
center of the four- lane highway to separate opposing traffic . 
Result : A rash of head- on collisions halted abruptly . 
Traffic signals . In Michigan , flashing signals 
(yellow on the main highway , red on the rrossroad) were 
installed at intersections that had no lights at all . Result : 
Accidents down 26% ; persons injured down 50% . 
If traffic safety can be improved so easily why 
isn ' t everybody doing it? One reason is that many states and 
cities won ' t spend money to hire enough qualified traffic 
engineers to do the job . One out of six states still has no 
traffic engineering units at all . Those that do generally 
give little more than token assistance to communities . And 
about half the cities of over 50 , 000 lack a full- time traffic 
engineer . 
155 
PROPOSAL : Set up traffic engineering units in all states 
with ample resources to help smaller communities . Every 
large city sould hire its own qualified traffic experts . 
UNIFORM LAWS 
Each state in the union has its own set of motor 
vehicle laws . No two are quite alike , and the result can be 
a jungle of confusion . As the motorist travels from state 
to state , and even from city to city , he is confronted with 
such a wide variety of rules of the road , gestures by police , 
signs , signals and markings as to defy human understanding . 
In some states you can turn right on red if the 
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road is clear , in others you can ' t . Some states still recog-
nize hand signals only , and not blinker lights . Rules differ 
from place to place as to which side a car should be passed on . 
It ' s interesting to note that 16% of all fatal 
accidents involve out- of- state drivers . How many of these 
are confused by unfamiliar traffic regulations? 
PROPOSAL : Each state should adopt uniform motor vehicle laws 
so that the rules of the road , signs and signals are the 
same all over . A Uniform Vehicle Code for states and Model 
Traffic Ordinances for localities , both drafted by highway 
safety experts , are available as a guide . 
Nothing less than drastic action can eliminate the 
sacrifice of human lives and maimed bodies , but there are 
some encouraging signs that concern over highway safety is 
growing . Here and there another state decides to get tough 
on traffic violators , or requires safety belts on all new 
cars or appropriates more money for driver educatian . 
The approach is piecemeal and slow , but at least, 
it has held even the number of highway deaths in recent 
years , although more cars drive more miles . 
~~at ' s needed is an all- out attack on highway 
accidents that will not merely stem the tide , but turn it . 
The steps outlined here , highway safety experts claim, can 
cut traffic deaths and crippling injuries to a fraction of 




To summarize, it is my opinion based on this inves-
tigation that automobile merit rating plans are causing serious 
damage to the insurance industry, the American Agency System 
and the insuring public due to inadequate rating procedures, 
over classification and increased expense r atios . I cannot 
help but feel , as outlined previously , with increased company 
expense ratios created by these plans that the resulting 
reduced commissions to agents will continually force more 
agents out of the insurance business. This seems to me 
inevitable . We can ' t expect that agents will remain in 
business if , inorder to remain status quo, they have to 
continually increase their business with little hope of 
advancing financially unless they work night and day. Not 
only will we see a constant reduction in our present day 
agency force but there will be little incentive left to 
attract new blood into the American Agency System . The net 
result will be langer and larger direct writing companies with 
the salesmen captive employees of these companies . 
As the expense ratios of companies increase due to 
multiple classifications and refinements of the same, plus 
the added cost of handling the exchange of experience infor-
mation and the record keeping, we can only assume a further 
reduction in commissions . The companies will be forced into 
direct billing , policy writing and the like even further 
eliminating the need for agents. This I find an impossible 
situation. Our country ' s economy has always been based upon 
a strong healthy competitive business atmosphere where the 
smaller independ~nt business man has the opportunity to 
operate and compete on a somewhat equal basis with the larger 
business enterprises . Merit rating plans seem to me to be 
another step in the direction of the suppression of free 
enterprise as we have known it throughout the history of our 
country . As fewer companies remain in business, and those 
that do remain are direct writers , the insuring public has 
less and less choi ce of companies from whom they can purchase 
insurance . This as we know will lead to governmental inter-
vention, with more legislation , which can eventually lead to 
insurance by government . We have seen the trend in this 
direction for some time . 
I believe that the majority of the people in the 
insurance industry would like to see a legitimate reduction 
in the cost of insurance and also give better protection for 
the premium paid . But in the ca se of automobile insurance, 
this can best be accomplished by means other than merit rating 
plans . We presently have many sound traffic laws in effect 
but unfortunately, we do not enforce them the way they should 
be. Serious studies have shown that accidents can be reduced 
with proper safety measures and good sound traffic laws and 
regulations properly enforced. Here again I feel that auto-
mobile insurance premiums can be reduced more legitimately 
in this manner, which from a social and moral viewpoint seems 
to be the more logical and sound method, as opposed to merit 
159 
rating plans with their arbitrary rating systems and expensive 
handling. 
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The automobile insurance industry has shown deep 
interest in highway safety. Since the inception of automobiles 
over a half century ago, the insurance industry has been taking 
the risks. Protection for the "innocent" driver is important, 
and this is the primary purpose of automobile insurance. The 
continuous hike in insurance rates from year to year is, to 
a great extent, brought on by the "bad" drivers. For this the 
good driver must suffer also, unfortunately. These growing 
premiums aid highway safety though. While many drivers may 
show little or no interest in accidents which do not involve 
them personally, they suddenly are concerned when they must 
help pay for them. This concern is equally shared by the 
automobile insurance industry. 
The uninsured motorist is another problem facing 
both the public and the industry . Government imposed, com-
pulsory automobile liability insurance laws, such as those 
enacted in Massachusetts, New York and North Carolina, are 
one of the solutions proposed . Uninsured motorist coverage 
made a part of the basic auto liability policy is another. 
But it is the overall view of the industry that the solution 
to the problem may be found at the state level. What may be 
good for one state might not necessarily be so for another . 
An all-time high of 41,000 persons lost their lives 
in highway accidents in 1962, according to Russell I. Brown, 
president of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. With 
this rising number of deaths on our roads , were additional 
upward trends in highway accidents , auto thefts and arson . 
These new highs, therefore , caused an increase, understandably 
in automobile premiums . But these rises in auto deaths and 
accidents continually mount, year after year. 
Many people believe these increases come about 
through rapid growth in the population and the number of auto-
mobiles on the road . However, this is not entirely true. If 
the public adopted more interest in highway safety, they 
could control this rise. They could possibly stop a great 
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deal of these meaningless deaths . Studies show that atten-
tion to and practice of safety have actually proven of definite 
worth . 
About 80 percent of the accidents which occur on 
our highways each day are caused by negligent drivers . These 
are the drivers who fail to obey traffic regulations, or just 
simply do not care . Drivers in this category, int_o which a 
great number of licensed operators fall, are destined to be 
killers . 
A number of these "killers" habitually disregard 
traffic signs . For some reason they believe these signs are 
put there just to be annoying or for numerous other reasons . 
Futhermore, studies definitely prove that if they disregard 
them long enough, their luck will run out . Then, these 
signs won ' t concern them anymore . They will soon be statis-
tics themselves . But this is not bad enough, unfortunately 
they usually take many innocent people along with them . 
Repeated arrests for traffic violations social 
maladjustment and various personality traits contribute 
greatly to the number of highway accidents, according to 
Metropolitan Life Company. Social scientists find that the 
drivers who commit traffic violations habitually are more 
likely to have accidents. A study of Iowa drivers demonstr-
ated the ratio of actual accidents to the number of expected 
was 134 percent among drivers with two or three violations. 
Speeding, improper passing and failure to observe stop signs 
were the moving traffic violations which had the highest 
association with accidents. 
Maladjusted persons, those having credit difficult-
ies, a record of juvenile or adult court offenses against 
person or property and truancy from school rate above average 
in accident probabilities as well, reports Metropolitian Life. 
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Another accident prone group is the drinking drivers. 
That drink taken to relax and give courage has proven it 
doesn't belong in the stomach of a driver. It is reported as 
the greatest single cause of highway accidents. During the 
Christmas and New Year season, over half of the serious 
accidents were attributed to alcohol. 
We can add the gamblers to this list also. The 
person who races trains and doesn't win. About 3,000 a year 
fall in this category. The amazing part of this is that 
about four out of ten of these accidents occur at "specially 
protected" grade crossings, according to the Journal of 
American Insurance. 
These are the causes of accidents . Now let ' s look 
at some of the suggested solutions . 
Saving lives in traffic accidents has been of great 
concern to the public , as well as those devoted to the safety 
field . If accidents must happen , how can more lives be saved? 
One of the most recent and increasingly important of these 
safety precautions are seat belts . An estimated 5,000 lives 
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a year could be saved if all cars were equiped with seat 
belts , and used . Car manufacturers have helped to save lives 
by adopting the installation of seat belts in new cars . This 
rather inexpensive " life saver" has received great interest 
from the driving public . However , it faces two deterrents . 
One is the driver who is too lazy or just does not seem to 
have time to have them installed . The other is the driver wh~ 
although he has seat belts , fails to use them. Some states 
have already passed laws requiring seat belts in cars and it 
is the general consensus that it will spread to all the other 
states with automobile manufacturers automatically installing 
them in all cars . 
Automobile manufacturers, although contributing 
greatly toward highway safety wi th safety devices , continue 
to add more horsepower to their cars . The manufacturers ' 
answer to the "Why ' s? ": "To meet the demands of the public," 
and supply speed when needed for passing . However, each 
additional mile an hour of speed brings death closer in the 
event of an accident . 
What is the an~e.r to driver ignorance? Drivers who 
disobey traffic regulations and have bad driving habits 
should not be allowed to endanger life and property . Stricter 
law enforcement and uniform traffic regulations are essential . 
Drivers ' schools for beginners to establish good driving 
habits and periodic checks on licensed drivers would also 
help. 
The Bureau of Public Roads, U. S. Department of 
Commerce are spearheading the attack on existing sign con-
fusion . Federal financial help is being offered as an 
incentive to states modernizing traffic signs in conformity 
with a new Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices for 
Streets and Highways . The offer is approved by organizations 
of State , County and MUnicipal officals, and concurred in by 
Federal Highway Administrator, Rex M. Whitton . 
Driver education heads the list of necessities in 
providing good drivers on our roads . Courses are being 
instituted in many of our high schools . These driver educa-
tion courses are on the increase . For one reason, they put 
better drivers on the road . In addition, the American Auto-
mobile Association estimates that driver education, by 
reducing accidents, has saved 5 , 570 lives and prevented 
200,000 injuries . The A. A. A. also estimates traffic safety 
benefits resulting from these courses have prevented an 
economic loss of some $700 million . The school year of 1961-
62 had 12 , 631 driver education courses being offered in 48 
states and the District of Columbia, with 1,314 , 420 students 
enrolled . Suprisingly, less than 50 percent of those students 
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coming of age to drive will not be afforded such courses. The 
program evidently has room for great expansion . 
Re-examination of licensed drivers such as is curr-
ently being conducted in Pennsylvania, has aided greatly in 
weeding out those who should not have licenses . During the 
first 19 months of this program according to reports , 8,176 
drivers were found to be physically unfit to drive . Another 
2,158 were considered mentally deficient, 806 uncontrolled 
epileptics and 701 chronic alcoholics. 
From Kentucky, road test failures confirm some of 
the beliefs that many drivers need more and better training . 
According to the "Time~'of Louisville, "On the average 
weekday , 125 people here try to get a driver ' s license . And 
74 of them flunk . " All of these points measure up to this . 
To have safety we must begin with safe drivers. Then maintain 
this safety through emphasis on creating and continuing "good 
driving habits . " 
In closing I feel that in view of areas such as 
increased company expense ratios plus the lack of adequate 
rating and experience data , along with the other points 
brought out that it is vital automobile merit rating plans 
be eliminated from the insurance industry. We have seen 
very strong evidence that automobile rates can be reduced 
far more effectively by proper law enforcement and sound 
safety regulations , rather than by artificial rating and 
classification procedures . It is my opinion, if the 
negligent driver can be reduced to a bare minimum, the 
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serious traffic violators and social maladjusted removed from 
the highways and that the drinking driver lose his license to 
operate, we would be well on the way toward reduced automobile 
insurance rates. If in conjunction with this type of law 
enforcement , the driving public and automobile manufacturers 
are induced to install recommended safety features in their 
cars , either voluntarily or through legislation, more than 
reduced automobile insurance rates will be accomplished- -
thousands of lives will be saved and thousands of accidents 
prevented from ever happening . I feel that the future trend 
toward lower automobile insurance rates lies in these areas 
of law enforcement and sound safety features, where we can 
best accomplish the objective from the more important social 
and moral aspect . It is here that any additional expenses can 
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